Some of you may have noticed that I’ve been away for a while. Sorry about that for those of you who missed me. Let’s just say that I learned the hard way the steep cost of blogging, twitter, facebook, writing for the Globe and Mail, all for free, while holding down a real paying job where one has to actually teach, research and contribute to the department you’re in. There’s only so many hours in a day.
While away there’s been a mounting backlog of stuff to write about, and over the next few weeks I’ll unfold a series of blogs, but let me kick off with the current state of play for the Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C11). This is the fourth effort to revamp copyright law in Canada in the last seven years, and things are rapidly coming to head.
The bill itself has numerous elements that are actually not bad as currently written (no term extension for copyright holders, a very limited role for ISPs, search engines and others as ‘digital gatekeepers’, an innovative user created content add-on to fair dealing, etc.), but deeply troubling aspects as well (the digital locks provisions, notably). While the Bill has passed second reading and finished committee review yesterday (March 7), during the latter stage the ‘copyright maximalists’ lined up one after another in a last ditch push to convince MPs that the bill needs to be radically overhauled so as to stuff it with all sorts of things that have thus far been rejected.
The bill goes back to Parliament for a clause-by-clause reading on Monday and while there’s still third reading and Senate review to pass, its now or never to make sure that last ditch attempts by a few lobbyists to rewrite the bill never see the light of day.
- Tough rules that could require intermediaries from ISPs through to search engines (e.g. Google), social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, Digg, Twitter) and data/web hosting sites (e.g. BlackSun and other ‘cloud’ providers) to block access to websites and others alleged to enable copyright infringement;
- The substitution of a ‘notice and take-down’ and graduated response regime that would see ISPs disconnect subscribers accused of repeated infringement instead of the much less intrusive ‘notice-and-notice‘ regime already included in the bill and practiced as a matter of course by all of Canada’s major ISPs.
- Claw backs to the innovative user-generated content (UGC) clause of the act that allows people to make mashups and remixes for non-commercial uses.
- Copyright term extension from lifetime of the creator plus 50 years to life + 70 years.
SOPA would have required: (1) ISPs to block access to ‘rogue websites’, (2) search engines to make such sites disappear from their results, (3) payment providers like Paypal and Visa cut-off payments, (4) advertisers to cut-off suspect sites from advertising placement, etc. The fundamental remaking of the Internet such activities contemplated unleashed a firestorm of protest, in the US and globally, ultimately leading to a tactical withdrawal of SOPA. Yet as SOPA was being withdrawn in the US, the copyright maximalists here in Canada were on a roll and began pushing what looks like much of the same thing.
The first indication of this can be seen in the language used, with the copyright maximalists such as Barry Sookman, James Gannon, the Entertainment Software Association of Canada (p. 6) and the Canadian Federation of Musicians carving up the world into “good guys” and “bad guys”, backed by repeated references to “wealth destroyers”. This stuff is imported directly from copyright maximalists as Daniel Castro at the supposedly ‘non-partisan’ Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) in the U.S. who referred to “parasites”, “rogues” and “leeches” to make his case for the ‘mother of SOPA’ early last year.
I’ve done this before but it bears repeating that the claims of wealth destruction are bogus. The trick is simple when it comes to the music industry, which in the present case has been bandying about a figure of $800 million dollar as having simply disappeared. That figure has been subsequently recycled by those on the committee, notably by Dean Del Mastro of the Conservatives, who stated on opening day, and drawing directly on the lobby group Music Canada:
“over $800 million a year [is] going missing. That’s coming right out of the pockets of artists, and that’s money that’s not being invested in this country (at 1645-50 in the transcripts).”
I have no idea where this figure has been tallied from, but it seems to be a magnification of already circumspect numbers that have been used in the past. The ruse in all this, as I’ve shown in earlier posts, is to take just one part of music industry revenues — recorded music sales (cds, LPs, etc.) — that really have suffered badly, i.e. dropping about $550 million (not $800m) in the past eight years, and then let this one segment stand for all revenues across the music industries as a whole. Looking at just the single category of recorded music industries, the situation does look dire, indeed, as the following diagram shows.
‘Recorded Music Industry’ Revenues in Canada, 1998 – 2010
The music business only appears to be in dire straits if we look at things from this cock-eyed view of the world. It looks entirely different when we include the recorded music segment and the three fastest growing segments of the business: (1) concerts; (2) internet and mobile phones; (3) publishing rights. Once we do that, the world looks entirely different, as the figure below shows:
‘Total Music Industry’ Revenues in Canada, 1998 – 2010
And this is not just the case for the music industry, but the movie industry as well. Again, the following chart helps illustrate the point (If you can’t see the figure below, click here).
Source: MPAA (2011). Theatrical Market Statistics.
And again, as with the music industry, these figures for “Box Office Revenues” are only half the matter, actually a little less than half the matter. When we open our eyes wider to look at all revenue sources for the film industry, including pay-per view tv, cable and satellite channels, video rentals, rapidly declining dvd sales, and fast rising new areas such as online subscriptions and digital downloads, the picture changes dramatically.
Doing that, it is clear that the movie business is doing even better than the box office numbers suggest, rising sharply on worldwide basis from $46.5 billion in 1998 to $87.4 billion in 2010. Table 1 below shows the trend.
Table 1: Worldwide Film Industry Revenues, 1998 – 2010 (US$ Millions)
Sources: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2010; 2009; 2003), Global Entertainment and Media Outlook.
The same case can be made for the electronic software and video gaming industries, the constituents of the Entertainment Software Association of Canada (ESAC) and their corporate lobbyists who have also been out their plying their trade, backed by similar dubious assertions.
The biggest problem with all of this is not the underlying faulty economics and total absence of meaningful evidence, but rather the complete bankruptcy of the lawyers and lobbyists peddling the case. They appear to have no moral compass when it comes to these matters and would just as easily turn ISPs, search engines and social networking sites into online gatekeepers working on their behalf as they’d toss their grandmothers overboard if she hacked a digital lock.
That their positions are indeed those of radical extremists can be seen by, for example, comparing them with other interests in the mainstream of business thinking, such as the Business Coalition for Balanced Copyright. The BCBC group represents most of the major ISPs in Canada (Bell, Rogers, Telus, SaskTel, MTS Allstream), Google, Yahoo, eBay, and so forth.
Thus, whereas the ESA (p. 7), Canadian Federation of Musicians, Canadian Independent Music Association (pp. 8-9), and copyright lawyers like Sookman and Gannon, call for a “much stronger and enforceable” notice-and-takedown regime, and graduated responses that would require ISPs to disconnect internet users accused of repeatedly infringing copyright material, the Business Coalition for Balanced Copyright forcefully rejects “notice-and-takedown and graduated response policies, which would turn intermediaries into ‘copyright police’” (p. 6). The group also rejects such a role being imposed on other digital intermediaries such as Google and social media services.
This is not unusual. To its credit, one of the world’s largest telecom and internet gear manufacturers, Ericsson, makes the same case in perhaps even more expansive language. Indeed, while supporters claim that the “graduated response” and digital intermediary strategy have only a minimal impact on individual liberties (see here and here), a recent UN Internet & Human Rights minced no words when it argued exactly the opposite point of view:
“. . . [C]utting off users from Internet access, regardless of the justification provided, including on the grounds of violating intellectual property rights law, [is] disproportionate and thus a violation of article 19, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (p. 21).
As for the attempted claw back on user-generated content, once again we see the copyright maximalists as not just being out of step with others but so wedded to a restricted view of the world that they think that copyright law is all about them. Yet, as James Boyle observes in The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind (pp. 66-70), copyright sets out rights for creators and owners, on the one side, and users, readers and audiences to do as they please with media acquired legitimately, on the other.
From the blinkered, ego-centric position if the maximalists, it’s easy to understand the drive to extend copyright terms from life of the author plus fifty years to seventy, but why not in perpetuity? That they have not pursued this is mere capitulation to political reality versus any kind of principled stance.
Reading any of the above ‘copyright maximalists’ interventions one would be hard pressed to know that copyright law is about two sets of interests: copyright holders and media users. Thus, from the position of the ESA (p. 7), Canadian Federation of Musicians, Canadian Independent Music Association and copyright maximalist lawyers like Sookman and Gannon, the idea that the Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C-11, sec. 22) would carve out space for non-commercial user-generated content is completely unacceptable, akin to a tax, a subsidy, a sop thrown to the masses. It is not, it is simply recognizing that people have rights too.
Nowhere is this idea more evident than in the digital locks provisions of C-11. Indeed, whilst the bill contemplates some reasonable measures and in fact does acknowledge a new user right with the user created content provision, the fact of the matter is that the restrictions on tampering with digital locks effectively nullifies those rights. In other words, what the bill gives with one hand, it taketh away with the other.
Again, the Business Coalition for Balanced Copyright is much more onside in this matter than the content and entertainment industries. Indeed, they are emphatic that the greater articulation of user rights in the Bill is an advance, and that this is especially so with respect to the user created content right, but state equally emphatically that “the digital locks provisions render them illusory” (p. 4).
Ericsson stakes out a similar position, setting out three general principles that ought to govern whatever digital locks mechanisms that are used and backed by the force of law:
- They should be “built on an interoperable set of proprietary standards or consist of DRM technologies that are based on open industry-wide standards;
- “Must not limit individuals’ statutory right to make legal private copies of Music, Books and AV works;
- “[C]ontract law and technical standards should not be allowed to override statutory exceptions such a fair use regime or private copy exemptions, thereby limiting the availability of lawfully acquired content to format or device shift within the scope of the private sphere” (p. 6).
My point in all this is not to make a fetish out of those who make, own and run the pipes that make up the Internet and the networked, digital public sphere. Instead, it is to highlight some of the mainstream currents of thinking on the issues at hand and to highlight those who are now trying to stuff Bill C-11 with SOPA-stlye restrictions that will gut the Internet for what they are: radical extremists, and well in the minority.
We are at a fundamental turning point, a constitutive moment when decisions taken now will set the course of developments across the telecom-media-Internet ecology for years, maybe decades, to come. We’ve just finished one set of hearings, and two more are on the immediate horizon: the CRTC’s hearings on Usage-Based Billing that begin Monday, July 11 and its upcoming so-called ‘fact finding’ hearings on Over-the-Top/new media.
In an interesting and helpful post today, Peter Nowak argued for 7 fundamental guiding rules for telecom issues in Canada, by which he meant the full gamut of issues right across the TMI (telecom-media-internet) spectrum. They are very useful guides and starting points for discussion, and easy to remember to boot. They are:
- Ditch Usage-Based Billing
- Don’t regulate new media/over-the-top (OTT) services (e.g. Netflix)
- Strengthen Net Neutrality
- Turf Foreign Ownership Restrictions
- Spectrum Set Aside for New Players
- Don’t Regulate Cross-media market power (aka vertical integration)
- Plan ahead for ‘shared networks’.
I find these very useful starting points; perhaps because I agree with most of them wholeheartedly (1, 2, 3, 5). Others I’d endorse with some caveats (4). Some I would expand on greatly (7). Others I would reject completely because they lack any basis in evidence, history or theory (6).
In terms of foreign ownership, Nowak proposes to drop all of the current limits on ownership of telecoms industries in Canada. He suggests that doing this will increase ‘real competition’ in the market by adding new players. This is not an uncommon position and in my view, its goal of increasing competition is basically a good one. Michael Geist and Mark Goldberg, each in their own way, make much the same point.
There are at least three or four problems, some of which I’ve outlined in another recent post, however, with this notion of dropping foreign ownership, although I am, to repeat, not against the idea in principle. First, there’s a good chance that we could drop the rules and nobody would come. These times are not those of the high-tide of foreign investment, in case anybody has been sleeping under a rock for the past few years.
Second, even if new investment does occur, this doesn’t necessarily mean that new competitors will enter the market. It’s more likely that they’ll just take over one of the incumbents, thereby switching the ‘title’ to the underlying telecom property but not doing anything at all to increase the market, unless the new owners turn out to be better than the current ones.
This is exactly the point made by a recent report by the C.D. Howe Institute. Despite its exuberant support of the idea that all foreign ownership rules across the telecoms-media-Internet board should be dropped, the Howe report was forthright that this would probably not result in more competitors. Instead it would lead to something much woolier: “performance gains” (p. 3).
Good luck assessing that, I’d say. Like “beauty”, performance would mostly be subjective and in the eyes of the beholder. Besides, with all of the existing telecom and broadcast players clamouring for less information disclosure, less regulatory oversight and less transparency, as they did one after another during the vertical integration hearings, how could we possibly know whether this nebulous objective was achieved?
Third, Nowak’s piece is couched in the idea of being a “pragmatic” set of proposals, rather than one that dogmatically sticks to what he sees as the right or left of the political spectrum. Thus unlike the Howe Report’s suggestion to drop foreign ownership rules across the board, he argues that if an integrated telecom-media player wanted to sell to foreign investors, say a US telco like AT&T or Verizon or, just as likely, a private equity group, then Bell Media, for example, would have to sell off its television interests, e.g. CTV (and 28 specialty channels, 28 local television stations and 33 radio stations, although he doesn’t spell that out).
Quebecor would have to do the same with respect to TVA, for example, and its extensive holdings of newspapers and magazines. Rogers would do the same with CityTV, 17 specialty channels and stable of magazines, while Shaw would have to part with its assets in television (Global) and specialty channels (Corus). Fat chance that’ll happen, I’d say.
Moreover, because there is a much broader range of media involved than just telecoms and television due to the fact that the ‘big four’ vertically-integrated media companies (VIMCos) (Bell, Rogers, Shaw, Quebecor) also all have, in different combinations, extensive holdings in radio, newspapers and magazines, it’s not going to be so easy to simply hive of telecoms from television. Indeed, with newspapers and magazines swaddled in their own bundle of tax and investment incentives designed to shore up Canadian ownership, unravelling this stuff will be messy and complicated.
To my mind, this part of the proposal not might have been as fully thought through as it could have been. The C.D. Howe Institute report at least has the virtue of purity and clarity: drop the barriers on everything, telecom, broadcasting, media in general.
Fourth, a very significant problem and one that strikes deeply at whether we want to further allow our culture to be ‘securitized’ and ‘militarized’, US telecom-media-Internet companies and investment capital comes with a lot of national security baggage, particularly so in the telecoms-media-Internet space. Their operations are subject to the Patriot Act and US telecom providers and ISPs have shown a propensity to cooperate with national security agencies in a very murky zone outside the rule of law and without cover of authorized warrants in ways that subsequent courts have found illegal (here, here, here and here).
Microsoft’s acknowledgement in Britain this past week that all U.S. companies like it, whether they admit it or not, are subject to the Patriot Act, was the first real candid acknowledgement of the extra-territorial reach of U.S. national security policy when it comes to matters of the information infrastructure. As Gordon Frazer, managing director of Microsoft UK, admitted, data stored in the cloud was well within the reach of the PATRIOT Act.
The acknowledgement came in response to a question posed by ZdNet journalist, Zack Whittaker. Whittaker asked,
“Can Microsoft guarantee that EU-stored data, held in EU based datacenters, will not leave the European Economic Area under any circumstances — even under a request by the Patriot Act?”
No, Fraser explained, “Microsoft cannot provide those guarantees. Neither can any other company”.
Tying networks, servers, the Internet and everything else in Canada that runs through and on top of these facilities to US national security policy is to sell out fundamental principles regarding open media, transparency and a networked free press for the feint hope that we might achieve a modicum of more competition than we have now, and even then, not ‘real competition’, but rather the kind of newfangled Schumpeterian ‘innovation economics’ pushed by the C.D. Howe report.
But let’s move beyond the issue of foreign ownership to Nowak’s sanguine approach to vertical integration, an approach that I also find problematic. Why? Because he offers no evidence, lessons from history, or theory to support his case.
This is problematic because current evidence shows that concentration across the spectrum of telecom-media-Internet services in Canada is high, in absolute terms, and relative to comparable international standards. I offered a snapshot of this evidence in an easy-to-digest form in my Globe and Mail column last week.
I’ll repeat that here for convenience. In Canada, the ‘big 4 VIMcos’ — Bell, Shaw, Rogers, Quebecor (QMI) — account for:
- 86 per cent of cable and satellite distribution market
- 70 per cent of wireless revenues
- 63 per cent of the wired telephone market
- 54 per cent of Internet Service Provider revenues
- 42 per cent of radio
- 40 per cent of the television universe
- 19 per cent of the newspaper and magazine markets
- 61 per cent of total revenues from all of the above media sectors combined.
These numbers are not trumped up in the slightest, and in fact on the matter of the Internet and television services they are actually lower than those offered by the CRTC because of the different methodologies we use. Nowak doesn’t refute these numbers; he just doesn’t deal with them.
Theory tells us that media concentration, for which vertical integration is just one manifestation, embeds a bias for trouble in the ‘structure of the media’. Tim Wu, in the Master Switch, gets things right when he sets up the simple premise that it is important for regulators to curb the potential for companies to leverage power and resources across the three main layers of the telecom-media-Internet system: networks, content/applications and devices.
In theory, I think he is right and, based on the current and historical record, strong measures are needed to prevent companies from leveraging control over any one of these three layers — networks, content, devices — to curb competition and diversity in any other layer.
Nowak is clearly aware of the connection in this regard and he hopes that his first and second principles — ditching UBB and leaving ‘new media’/OTT untouched by regulators — will take care of vertical integration problems by removing the ability of Bell, QMI, Rogers and Shaw from using bandwidth caps and the pay-per Internet model to basically undermine the viability of rival online video distribution services (AppleTV, GoogleTV, Netflix, etc.) that they see as a threat to their own broadcast services. I think that these are important steps, but insufficient to deal with the full range of ways in which leverage across the three layers of the telecom-media-Internet system can be used to hogtie competitors and stifle the fullest range of voices and expression possible.
This is not just hypothetical potential, either, but rather documented by case after case of examples where either access to content or to networks is deployed in the strategic rivalry between less than a handful of players in oligopolistic markets. And when highly capitalized Netcos such as Bell own much smaller content companies like CTV, they have every incentive to use the latter to shore up the position of the former.
The recently completed vertical integration hearings at the CRTC were replete with example after example of this, from network companies such as Telus, SaskTel, MTS Allstream and Public Mobile as well as media content companies, whether the CBC or smaller production companies like Stornoway Productions.
These examples are not just limited to Canada either, but global in scope. They are behind the recent detailed regulatory framework put into place in the US by the FCC and Department of Justice that blessed the merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal, but not before taking comparatively stern steps, especially by Canadian standards, to ensure that NBC-Universal content could not be locked up or used by Comcast to the disadvantage of rivals in the broadcasting business. Furthermore, Comcast was also required to make its television and film content available to Internet competitors and ‘online video distributors’ (OVDs), a new category designed to cover services such as Netflix, Hulu, AppleTV, and so on, and to adhere to open Internet requirements generally.
Other countries such as Australia, Belgium, Britain and New Zealand have dealt with their own experience of networks being used to trample competition and diminish the range of voices and expression possible by going even further to set up rival ‘unbundled’ open networks (Australia) or by mandating ‘structural separation’ between incumbents’ networks (layer 1) and other layers (services, content, devices) in the system. In an important post yesterday, Bill St. Arnaud also talks about the development of networks that are essentially based on pick and choose access to capabilities and functionalities that respond flexibly and recursively to user generated communication and information needs
The problem, thus, is one that is buttressed by evidence, by theory and by global experience. In light of this, robust measures rather than a sanguine approach to vertical integration is most definitely needed.
And to bring this to a close, the issues raised by vertical integration are not the consequence of innovative, new industrial arrangements or newfangled theory, but rather deeply entrenched historically and indeed endemic to situations where those who control the medium (networks) are also in a position to control the messages (content) flowing through those networks.
Thus, in the first decade of the 20th century in Canada, the Canadian Pacific Telegraph Co. and Great North Western Telegraph Co (the latter under ownership control of Western Union) had exclusive distribution rights for the Associated Press news services in Canada. As part and parcel of the telegraph companies’ bid to buttress their dominance in the highly lucrative telegraph business against a couple of smaller rival upstarts (the Dominion Telegraph Co in Canada and Postal Telegraph Co. in the US), the Canadian Pacific Tel. Co. and Western Union-backed Great North Western Tel. Co. offered one of their premier set of clients — newspapers across the country — access to the AP news service at a very cheap rate. In fact, they gave it away “free”. Sound familiar? (observant readers might also note the persistent recurrence of ‘network infrastructure duopolies’, too)
The AP news service was so cheap because instead of paying the cost for both the news service and the telegraph charges for delivering it from one place to another, Canadian Pacific Tel. Co. and Great North Western Tel Co only charged newspaper subscribers the ‘transmission costs’ for the AP service. The content, under such arrangements, was ‘free’. Of course, this was a real boon to established members of the press and to AP, while it also helped to stitch up the companies’ lock on the telegraph business. It was a menace to rival news services and a competitive press or telegraph system, however.
The fly-in-the-ointment was that any competitor news service was at a huge disadvantage because its subscribers had to pay the ‘transmission costs’ plus the cost of the news service. Thus, when Winnipeg-based upstart, the Western Associated Press, tried to set up a rival Canadian news service to that of the Associated Press in 1907, it found it’s opportunities blocked at every step of the way because there was simply no way its subscribers could pay two costs — transmission and for the news service — while the AP service was essentially given away free after subscribing newspapers paid the telegraph companies their fees for distribution.
As one muckraking journalist W. F. Maclean wrote in the Toronto World,
“attempts on the part of public service companies [the telegraph companies] to muzzle free expression of opinion by whitholding privileges that are of general right cannot be too strongly condemned.”
The matter found its way before one of the long-lost predecessors to today’s CRTC, and one of the first regulatory bodies in the country, the Board of Railway Commissioners. Canadian Pacific Tel. Co. came out swinging, arguing that the BRC simply had no authority over the news services or to compel it to separate the costs of the news services from transmission costs.
Times were different then, it seems, and the BRC didn’t wilt one bit amidst the hot-heated rhetoric but blasted back that it was compelled by law to insure that rates were ”just and reasonable” and that unless transmission rates were separate, explicit and equitable “telegraph companies could put out of business every newsgathering agency that dared to enter the field of competition with them” (BRC, 1910, p. 275).
The upshot was separation of control over the wires from control over the news business. The regulator had all the authority in the world it needed to break up the ‘double headed news monopoly’. It is a lesson that the CRTC and everybody else interested in ensuring that we oversee the creation of the most open media with the maximum range of voices and creative expression possible should pay close attention to.
Of course, the modalities of communication have changed tremendously and we now live in age of information abundance rather than scarcity, but as Tim Wu’s Master Switch and the mounting evidence before our very eyes attests, the basic logic of leveraging content and networks to confer advantages on one’s own operations whilst driving others into submission, if not out of business altogether, is alive and well.
This is a basic and easy-to-grasp point, and until we firmly implant it at the heart of the structure and regulation of the telecom-media-Internet system, we will continue to forgo the economic, political, cultural and personal benefits of the most open network media system possible and which further the goals and values that define a free and democratic society.
On that score, Nowak is right, these are not ‘left’ and ‘right’ issues. They are issues, principles and values of concern to all who take the precepts of liberal capitalist democracy seriously and who see in the status quo a condition that is badly lacking by even that non-ideological/utopian standard.
A new report by the CD Howe Institute came out today. It’s not big, just 3 pages and seemingly informed by a bunch of guys sitting around a table at the Howe’s ‘inaugural meeting’ last week (June 17).
It is brash, and some might dress it up as bold: drop all limits on ownership of telecoms and media industries in Canada, it says. Full stop.
No phase out. No ‘newcomer advantages’, full stop again. No attempt to separate the ‘medium’ (wires, spectrum, sewer access) and the message (broadcasting, integrated suite of ‘content’ from mags to blogs) from one another. A digital free for all, you might say.
Perhaps the gentlemen, and they were with the exception of only a single woman, thought this might be a good idea while they sat around and chatted last Friday afternoon. Apparently, there were not so many women ‘law & economics’ types available to join them, given that all but out of the 16 places apparently went to the guys and boys from Bell (see below). I guess ‘law and economics’ types like Sheridan Scott, a hard liner in these matters, and Monica Auer, who generally takes the opposite tack by speaking eloquently and passionately on the telecom and media workers’ behalf, weren’t available, or any of the other smart dames roaming these circles as I saw, in the minority, at the CRTC’s hearings this week.
I looked at the composition of ‘the deciders’ not just because their gender was so obviously skewed, but because I recognized the names of most of the guys. One in particular leapt out, Jeffrey Church, a University of Calgary economics professor. By all accounts, he’s an excellent teacher. Professor Church caught my eye because, in addition to advising the ‘big 3Ps’ in Canada as I’ll call them — Petroleum, Alberta Beef Producers, Pharma — Professor Church just wrote an economic analysis for Bell as part of the very, very important vertically-integrated telecom-media-Internet hearings now being held by the CRTC.
According to Church in his voluminous 93 page submission on Bell’s behalf, vertical integration is good for consumers and for Canada (p.5). I disagree, strongly, for reasons set out regularly in this blog (e.g. here) and my column for the Globe and Mail on Monday.
It’s not just Church that is so closely tied to Bell, but also Marcel Boyer, Bell Canada Professor Emeritus of Industrial Economics, Université de Montréal, as the CD Howe report indicates on the back of this slim 3 page ‘report’. 2 out of 16 does not a majority make, obviously, but their presence does stand out.
The rest of the lot in this ‘law and economics’ crowd does not seem very adventuresome, either. I know one professor occupying a BCE endowed chair that won’t be called upon, Professor Robert E. Babe at the University of Western Ontario, for he has traced the propensity of telecoms historically to go from limited competition to ‘total consolidation’ on a regular basis. Let us say that the fact that Howe ‘report’ has zero to say about such notions is not all that surprising.
The 3 page ‘report’ is candid that dropping the foreign ownership limits on everything – telecom, media, internet — will not increase the number of competitors in the market. As it states, “given the small size of the Canadian market, the consensus view saw no major change in the number of national competitors”.
Translation, the big three companies in wireless telecoms — Bell, Rogers, Telus — for instance will still account for about 94% of the market (according to CWTA 2010), but they might be owned by yet a larger foreign based telco (Vertizon, the ‘new’ AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, etc.) or may private equity funds. Me, I have doubts many foreign investors — telcos, priv equity funds, banks — will even come if permitted to do so (or if we want ‘em to on such ‘carte blanche’ terms). I’m not alone on this, and hardly radical, given that even the World Bank states that the keys to effective foreign ownership is a ‘strong state’ able to regulate and competition.
Instead, the Council of 15 wise men and 1 smart woman says, drawing on newfangled theory about ‘competitive innovation’ drawn from the right-wing side of Schumpeterian ‘innovation economics’, that “the gains from liberalization would likely result . . . from better performance by telecommunications market participants”. Umm, I hope so, especially because its this same crowd breying for the withdrawal of any meaningful conception of regulation or state intervention. The CRTC’s horizons have been blinkered and public ventures like CANARIE have had their wings clipped. How foreign capital will ‘improve’ performance standards in Canada is not clear to me/self-evident.
The report advocates this ‘regulatory shock and awe’ to be developed in one swell swoop, with no distinctions kept between telecoms and broadcasting, between networks and content, between incumbents and newcomers. The telecom-media-Internet sectors are now so entangled on account of digitization and how people use media that they must be treated together as a whole. Partial agreement there about treating things ‘holistically’.
More targetted measures are suggested as alternative to foreign ownership for whatever ”cultural policies” might be left over. Some of these ‘targetted measures’ I believe in — securing financing for content production, shelf space, strong CBC — and they have been promoted by at least two of the same writers involved in today’s 3 page missive (e.g. see Hunter and Iacobucci, with a third author Michael J. Trebilcock).
There are several problems with this “report”, however, that make it’s contribution to public discussion dubious, despite the fact that it will gain much attention.
1. Three pages is not a report and should not be pitched as one.
2. The Council of the Wise is skewed along lines suggested above, ie. by Bell and by Gender. Bell has always had a visible hand in the telecom, broadcasting and media industries, indeed, since it began broadcasting speeches, songs and sermons in the 1880s and took-over the Chairmanship of the 1905 Mulock Commission which had originally been convened to look into the underdevelopment of the telephone system in Canada in the early days of the 20th century.
So, that Bell continues to be front and centre 100 years later, at the dawn of the 21st century, is both a marker of continuity and somewhat unsurprising, but equally suspect/problematic in each of these occasions. The presence of Bell’s hired gun (Church), a Bell sponsored ‘academic chair’ (emeritus, Boyer), and BCE CEO George Cope’s speech at the C.D. Howe two months ago all so bunched up in time and common stance has a whiff of something not quite right about it.
3. While I don’t actually have many problems with increasing competition and dissolving lines between the medium and the message, or the network infrastructure and content, we also need to be upfront about the fact that the former (media infrastructure) are generally scarce and the latter (messages) abundant. In today’s OECD Communication Outlook 2011, it is clear that, generally speaking, the top 2 ‘netcos’ in each of the OECD countries account for between two-thirds and three quarters of fixed and mobile telecom network markets in each of the OECD countries (pp. 56-59). This means:
- that Netcos generally should be regulated for market power, ‘messagcos’ generally not.
- ties between Netcos and Messagcos are congenitally fraught with problems and propensity for anti-competitive behaviour.
- Free speech standards and the values of a ‘networked free press‘ are also at play (and here). As the United Nation’s Human Rights Council recently stated, those standards apply to the Internet and people should have, as Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights stated before it in 1948, the freedom to receive and impart any information, through any media regardless of frontiers. At the CRTC Hearings on vertical integration the other day, Bell’s Mirko Bibic and Shaw’s brass called the idea that people should have access to any content on any device “preposterous”. The C.D. Howe ‘report’ is oblivious to these considerations.
4. The C.D. Howe report misses reality and the ‘big picture’. Perhaps this is because there is not a whiff of heterodox thinking among the ‘law & economics’ experts who wrote it. Not one ‘ecclectic’ economists, not one wild eyed, crazy lawyer, not a communication and media scholars or a historian in sight.
This is too bad because as long as it continues to be the case, people will continue to talk past one another. And it also means that ‘reports’ like this one, and the policies and approaches that actually do follow close in tow in the ‘real world’, will lack legitimacy.
5. Without being able to expand their horizon, the authors of the C.D. Howe ‘report’ blithely countenance “North American integration”. Economically, as I said above, I don’t have a particular problem with that, although I doubt that things will pan out as they expect, and even that what the Howe folks do expect ain’t much (“better performance” from same number of players).
Politically and culturally, however, there is a problem, not with Cancon and ‘traditionalist/romanticist’ conceptions of culture, but ‘network culture’. Netcos and search engines are now closely allied with state security, military strategy and defense contractors. It’s probably best to keep some clear blue water between these domains. The authors give no hint that they have even thought of this.
Netcos, ISPs, search engines, etc. are also constantly being badgered by lobbyists as well as politicians in Canada and the U.S. to play a greater role on behalf of media and entertainment industries (for most recent and strong opposition to this from within just the mainstream’, see here). The approaches have differed, with the last government in Canada wisely turning down lobbyists push to have ISPs play the role of ‘copyright cop’, disconnecting people who repeatedly are identified as ‘copyright bandits’.
The International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) launched it’s efforts to lean hard on ISPs and search engines, and less on Digital Rights Management (DRM), in 2008. It has been picking off ‘wins’ for this agenda around the world, but not so much yet in Canada.
Yesterday, CNet journalist Greg Sandoval reported that AT&T, Comcast, and Verizon “are closer than ever to striking a deal with media and entertainment companies that would call for them to establish new and tougher punishments for customers who refuse to stop using their networks to pirate films, music and other intellectual property”. That turn-of-heart, in turn, he reports, was eased by coaxing from the Obama Administration and the National Cable TV Association.
The pressure is already strong in Canada, but so far government and regulators have refused to make ISPs the deputies of the media and entertainment industries or to regulate the Internet as a broadcast distribution medium. On law and order, however, the push is for a stronger state and more compliant Netcos and Searchcos.
While there’s lots of dots to connect between all of these latter points, the key idea is that integration at the network and market levels is going to increase pressure to harmonize tougher matters that impinge greatly on network media, and thus network culture. That the blokes and one women from C.D. Howe have nary a word about this and don’t dare let the phrases ‘network neutrality’ and ‘open media’ cross their lips is a problem of the first order because those concerns, as sure as night follows day, are at the heart of the emergent network media culture. How can foreign ownership be reconciled with these concerns should be the question, rather than if it if good or bad altogether.
In sum, until we can start speaking one another’s language and stop passing off economic and policy platitudes backed by those with big stakes in the game, the nominal ideas presented in this “report” should be shelved and other big questions — vertical integration, for example — put on hold.
Ultimately, Pork, Petroleum and Pharma are not the same as telecoms and media. We need some new thinking for ‘new media’.
Until we recognize this, we’re not going to get very far, at least in a a way that takes into account the full range of issues at hand, rather than the economists narrow measuring rod of value.
As I normally do, this post largely replicates my column for the Globe & Mail today with the addition of a few more links so that you can follow up on things that I refer to. I was at the opening of the hearings today and plan to be there a few more times this week and next. I’ll have more to report in a few days.
Altogether, seventy-eight different parties filed interventions with the CRTC. There are 50 scheduled to give presentations over the next two weeks. You can find all of the links to the briefs and studies filed with the CRTC by the companies and other intervenors here.
The CRTC’s hearings on vertical integration began Monday. For the next two weeks this means that the four major vertically-integrated media companies in Canada – Bell, Shaw, Rogers and Quebecor – could face tough questions about whether they have the clout to dominate telecom, media and Internet services across the country and, if so, what should be done to curb that potential?
The hearings were scheduled last November after the CRTC approved cable giant Shaw’s $2 billion take-over of bankrupt Canwest Media’s television assets (27 television stations, the Global network, 30 specialty cable and satellite channels). It was given added impetus after Bell’s $3.2 billion deal to acquire CTV and the A-channels was given the green light in March.
There is every reason to be skeptical about these hearings given that they are a classic case of “bolting the barn door after the horse has already left the stable”. It is also CRTC approvals all down the line that have allowed integrated media conglomerates to become the norm to begin with.
In the U.S., media conglomerates have become the exception (Comcast/NBC-Universal) after the disastrous AOL Time Warner merger, the collapse of the ‘old’ AT&T, break-up of Viacom-CBC, and so on. Indeed, vertical integration is in retreat in almost every other developed capitalist democracy.
We should also remember that Bell attempted – and failed– to extend its reach from the medium to the message from 2000 to 2006 by taking-over CTV, CHUM, and the Globe & Mail. The fate of Canwest was worse. Yet, we seem to be stuck in a time warp, with CEOs, Cabinet Ministers and the CRTC singing in unison that media conglomerates are all the rage, for much the same reason that they did back in the 1990s.
Be that as it may, Bell, Shaw, Rogers and Quebecor Media Inc. (QMI) do exemplify the trend in Canada. They are the ‘big four’ and the hearings are all about them. They stand at the apex of a set of telecom, media and Internet markets that have grown greatly from $42 billion in revenue in 1998 to $73 billion today (in constant 2010$).
The real issues, however, are not about the sheer size of the ‘big four’, but their market power. Between them, Bell, Shaw, Rogers and QMI control:
- 86 percent of cable and satellite distribution
- 70 percent of wireless revenues
- 63 percent of the wired telephone market
- 54 percent of Internet Service Provider revenues
- 42 percent of radio
- 40 percent of the television universe
- 19 percent of the newspaper and magazine markets
- 61 percent of total revenues from all of the above media sectors combined.
That, by any standard measure of concentration, constitutes a highly concentrated market.
The fact that Bell, Shaw, Rogers and Quebecor stand as gateways to so much raises concerns that they will give undue preference to their own services rather than serve as open gateways to the maximum range of entertainment, communication, knowledge and news possible. In this regard, more is a stake than anti-competitive behaviour, because the range of expression available in a society is a barometer of the quality of freedom of expression and democracy in it. None of the ‘big four’ waxes much about this, however, insisting as they do that the laws of normal economics should be the only measuring rod of value.
To be sure, the ‘big four’ are hardly the only players in town. There is also an important second tier of a dozen or so smaller players that have stuck to their knitting in just one or two media: Telus, MTS, SaskTel, Cogeco, Bragg/Eastlink, the CBC, Astral, Postmedia, Transcontinental, Power Corp, Thomson/Globe & Mail, Torstar and Brunswick News. Then there is a third tier made up of the thousands who fill in the nooks and crannies of the media universe: Wikipedia, the Mark, media workers, star journalists, opinion leaders, blogs, your best friend, personal websites and so on.
The position of all these parties turns on where they sit. To the ‘big four’, to the extent that there’s ever been a ‘golden age’ of media, the picture just presented is it. Thousands upon thousands of actors, big and small, making it nearly impossible for any single entity to exert excess influence over it all.
According to Bell’s hired-gun, University of Alberta economics professor, Jeffrey Church, “vertical integration is beneficial for consumers”. According to him and other briefs filed by the big four, consolidation is good for consumers and Canada because:
- it reflects efficiencies, spurs competitive innovation and is a global trend.
- telecom, media and Internet markets in Canada are “highly competitive”.
- our ‘small media economy’ needs a few deep-pocketed ‘national champions’ to compete globally and invest heavily in innovation at home.
- instances of harm are mostly imaginary and few and far between.
- it helps keep “consumers . . . within the regulated system” (Shaw, p. 4)
The collapse of media conglomerates elsewhere, the evidence of market power above, and the fact that Canada has the eight largest media economy in the world, after France and Italy, and just before South Korea and Spain, should raise an eyebrow or two about claims one through three. Claim four is false (see below), and the last one repugnant.
Many in the second tier and ‘nooks and crannies’ of the media also challenge these claims. Telus, for instance, argues that the harms are real, not prospective. Buying program rights, for example, from CTV, the Comedy Network, TSN and two-dozen other channels, it argues, became a whole lot harder, and more expensive, after Bell Media took them over.
Access, a cooperatively run cable-system-cum-Internet provider in Saskatchewan raises similar concerns. Those that have content, but not distribution networks – Astral, CBC, media workers – make a similar case, but point to how control over networks rather than programming rights can cause real world harm.
Periodic squabbles between Quebecor and Bell highlight much the same point, with Quebecor’s SunTV hobbled in equal measure by self-inflicted wounds and its inability to sign an acceptable ‘contract for carriage’ with Bell. Just last week, the CRTC declared that Bell’s decision to move Shaw’s ‘Cave TV’ service into the upper stratosphere of its offerings conferred an undue preference on channels Bell owned, and ordered the change to be reversed. If these pitched Goliath versus Goliath battles are regular occurrences, we can only imagine the problems that David – the little guy – is having.
While Bell, Shaw, Rogers and QMI operate their own online video services, they assert that congestion problems require them to manage traffic through usage-based billing and bandwidth caps, although such measures cripple rival online video distributors such as Netflix, Apple TV, GoogleTV, and so on. Netflix, for instance, downgrades its services relative to standards elsewhere, and bitterly complains about having to do so, all the time. Smart and savvy telecom guys like Jean-Francois Mezei and rabble-rousing groups like Open Media are convinced that such practices are a deadweight on creativity, innovation, freedom of expression and an open internet.
For the public, the practices just listed and networks that are under-developed and over-priced by global standards constitute subtle yet pervasive constraints on how we use and experience the emerging networked digital media. Stubbornly, Canadians lean against the wind and remain heavy Internet users, downloading and uploading to and from Youtube, virtuously contributing to Wikipedia, and watching porn at rates that rank at the very top by global standards.
All this, too, despite the fact that, as Shaw’s brief repeatedly states, the industry and regulators are one when it comes to the goal of keeping “consumers in the existing broadcasting system”. We can only imagine what things might be like if they strove for the maximum freedom of expression possible, rather than only “as much diversity as practicable”, as the CRTC put it in its 2008 Diversity of Voices decision.
Ultimately, the problems of fully-integrated media conglomerates are congenital, not imaginary. They run hand-in-hand with media history the world over and until we accept that, we’ll have to continue settling for scraps off the table as regulators let the ‘big four’, I mean, the market rip.
Last week in the run-up to the G8 leaders meeting in France, French President Nicolas Sarkozy convened a conference among prominent media and Internet types. The goal: how to ‘civilize’ the Internet.
As Sarkozy said,
The internet is the new frontier, a territory to conquer. But it cannot be a Wild West. It cannot be a lawless place, where people are allowed to pillage artistic works with no limits.
And you know what, he’s right. The Internet should not be a lawless frontier disconnected from the real world, and it is not. It is already deeply shaped by the same legal, political, economic and social forces that govern our actions daily.
That said, the crux of the approach being advocated by Sarkozy, and perhaps to come out in a communique at the end of the G8 meetings, is that Internet Service Providers, search engines and others are being ‘deputized’ to act on behalf of law enforcement officials and vested interests in the entertainment and ‘copyright industries’ (see the New York Times story as well). That is, they are being turned into adjuncts of both the state and vested interests to deal with matters that are, some more than others, sordid ones indeed: child pornography, money laundering, counterfeit goods and software and, of course (and in some instances) large-scale enabling of copyright infringement.
Of course, I’m the last to stand in support of child porn, money laundering, industrial scale piracy, and so forth. However, I am opposed to the full-court press that is now coming from three directions that aim to turn ISPs and search engines from being ‘gateways’ to the Internet to ‘gatekeepers’.
First, and largely since 2008, ISPs have come under a full-court press by the Recording Industry Association of America and the International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) to adopt a notice and take-down procedure. In this situation, once notified of allegations of copyright infringements, ISPs would block Internet users access to such content and, in some cases, cut off repeat offenders. Search engines would essentially make such content disappear by turning up a blank when suspect sites were queried.
The problem with this is already well-known: the gap between what is allegedly an infringement and what the law in each country actually determines to be so is big indeed. What typically happens is that private contractors using automated ‘notice and take-down’ systems take a shotgun approach, capturing much that is on the side of right in the process.
People caught in the cross-hairs have a steep hill to climb to prove their innocence. That is wrong because it turns presumptions of innocence on their head. Here’s a link to the Electronic Frontier Foundations “Takedown Hall of Shame” to get a sense of how overly-broad notices also curtail freedom of expression.
Second, Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies began to go out of favour in the last few years, but as they were being abandoned, after 2008 the RIAA and its international counterparts were signing new memoranda of understanding with ISPs that enrolled the latter in the effort to combat piracy. The RIAA and IFPI have also pushed hard for national laws to accomplish the same ends. In other words, the RIAA is using technology, States and Markets to accomplish its goal of clamping down on content.
Sarkozy and the French Government were early and enthusiastic endorsers of such efforts and the three strikes law in France is considered by most to be particularly draconian. The IFPI has also chalked up several wins for such measures in other countries as well, including Sweden, South Korea, Taiwan and the UK, among a few others (see pp. 25-27).
Now, however, and at least in Britain such measures are under severe challenge in the courts by way of initiatives launched by two of Britain’s biggest ISPs, BT and TalkTalk, and in the court of public opinion, where they are losing badly. Yet, just as such measures come under severe criticism and challenge in some countries, they are being expanded in others.
Cont’d on Page 2 . . . . . . . .
Shaw announced plans to implement a new regime for its Internet Access services this week. There is much in the announcement to be commended, and much still to rail against.
First, the much welcomed headline news is that Shaw’s new plans basically double the bandwidth caps for its Lite and High Speed services, while the caps for the Extreme service will be increased from a 100 GB cap to 250. The prices and the speed for each service will remain the same. Nice start!
Second, Shaw is promising much needed investment in broadband networks over the next year and a half and to convert all of its television channels to digital. As the company notes,
In making this move we will triple the capacity of our network, freeing up space for more Internet, HD and On Demand programming.
Third, the new pricing regime makes available some of the fastest and most generous high-speed Internet services in North America. It will most certainly, as Michael Geist, Peter Novak and others have noted, put pressure on the rest of the ‘big 5 ISPs’ – Bell, Rogers, Quebecor, Telus and Cogeco – to fall in line.
Shaw’s new bandwidth caps will be between two (vs Rogers) and five (Bell) times as great as those of the other dominant ISPs, as the following table illustrates.
The commitment to invest heavily in a “major upgrade of our network”, and to convert all its channels to digital, in order triple the capabilities of its networks is good news. It would seem to bring Shaw closer into line with global trends (and ahead of standards in most of the United States).
The emphasis on network upgrades dovetails with ‘hierarchy of priorities’ set by the CRTC in its Network Neutrality decision too, or as it prefers to call it, the Internet Traffic Management Practices decision. Regardless of terminology, the basic idea is that Network Investment is the preferred method to deal with any congestion that exists. Shaw’s proposal appears to be in line with that idea.
If it acts as a spur for greater investment by the other major telecom and ISP providers, all the better, but we should not hold our breath. Their feet will have to be held to the fire.
Iron Fist Replaced by the Velvet Glove?
But now for the odious bits of Shaw’s intended course of action.
First, the highest speed services with the most generous bandwidth caps, or no caps at all, are only available bundled with either of Shaw’s Legacy TV or its Personal TV model. And these services will also only become available over the next 18 months as its networks are upgraded.
The bundled, highest performance Internet offerings offer speeds of between 50 and 250 Mbps and genereous bandwidth caps of between 250 GB per month and a voluminous 1 Terrabit (TB), as well. The caps are removed altogether in some cases. This is a good thing and appears to bring Shaw’s offerings closer into line with ‘global best practices’.
But tying the highest-performance Internet service to its ‘legacy’ television services is a blatantly protectionist bid — a first line of defense for Shaw’s Global television network, massive cable and satellite distribution system, and big suite of cable and satellite television channels. Enrolling you in its Internet services enrolls you unwittingly into the Shaw Business Projection Plan for all these other services. Your tail wagging its corporate dog.
The fact that Shaw is able to leverage control over its networks to influence the channels of communication flowing through them is not surprising. It is a problem as old as Roman Roads and Venetian Canals. It is a problem of the first order, for all that, and to be resisted now as much as in the past.
In 1910, the long lost precursor to the CRTC, the Board of Railway Commissioners came to a conclusion that would be startling if it happened today. As the BRC found in the ‘double-headed telegraph news monopoly’ case, Cdn Pacific Telegraph Co. and Great North Western Telegraph Co (the latter under ownership control of Western Union) had exclusive distribution rights for Associated Press news services in Canada. Cdn Pacific Telegraph was charging its
. . . subscribers for the commodity, viz., the news, delivered at a flat rate; . . . while in the case of rivals [Western Asssociated Press] the payment . . . was for the transmission, and not the commodity. . . . [T]elegraph companies could put out of business every newsgathering agency that dared to enter the field of competition with them” (BRC, 1910, pp. 274-275).
The bundling of ‘connectivity’ and ‘content’, as Shaw does in its new plans under one corporate umbrella is one of the biggest problems with vertical integration. Always has been, always will be.
Theoretically, the CRTC can do something about this after its upcoming vertical integration hearings next month. It can be taken for granted, however, that Hell will freeze over before anyone seriously considers divestiture of Canada’s big 5 integrated telecom-media behemoths — Shaw/Global (Corus), Bell/CTV, Rogers/CityTv, Quebecor (TVA), Cogeco (Radio).
The government could set up a competitor entity, the Canadian National Broadband Co (CNBC), just like the Australians. That’s not likely to happen either, the price tag of $40 plus billion being only one among many economic and ideological deterrents.
The CRTC should give serious consideration to imposing ‘functional separation’ requirements on the big 5; it would be a good compromise. Not to hot, not too cold — the Goldilocks solution to vexed Internet policy issues.
Just to be churlish, we can also note that Shaw’s plan to convert analog tv channels to digital ones is not a bright, new idea. It is long overdue and coincides with the mandatory switch over to digital broadcasting for the rest of the broadcasting system in August 2011. Shaw’s acceptable use policies are also just as abhorent as they have always been, setting out
- restrictions on what people can and cannot do with their Internet connections.
- broad assertions of its authority to act on behalf of copyright claims a
- its right to make ‘editorial judgments’ about all kinds of content hosted on and moving through its pipes.
- and to own user created content.
Shaw has moved the ball forward and we should not only hope, but push to have at least the minimum bar it has set met by the remaining ‘big five’ ISPs in Canada that control access to roughly 95 percent of Canadian subscribers: Bell, Rogers, Quebecor, Telus and Cogeco.
The advances so far did not come from the good graces of Shaw. They came from an extraordinary confluence of pressure that has been put on Shaw and all of Canada’s ISPs with greater and greater intensity over the past four to five years.
The three most significant pressures shaping the flow of events are probably:
- Open Media and the massive public that it helped to mobilize;
- the ‘tweet’ in the night by then Industry Minister Tony Clement scolding the CRTC for its UBB decision in January of this year and the upcoming hearings to be held by the CRTC this July into the matter which have ensued partially as a result;
- and crucially, the pressure from investment bankers, who saw mounting public anger and the threat of regulation as a potential danger to Shaw and the others’ bottom line and their ability to raise capital.
Ultimately, while we should appreciate what Shaw’s announcement has put on the table, this should not divert our attention from the fact that much remains. Nor should it give Shaw a free pass when it comes to the CRTC’s upcoming hearings on vertical integration.
A new, independent report commissioned by the British Prime Minister has just come out. It’s observations are astute and damning: mostly with respect to the claims used to rush the Digital Economy Act of last year into law after only 2 hours of Parliamentary debate and for the exceedingly poor quality of the evidence upon which that questionable law, and the debate over copyright/intellectual property generally, takes place.
The report was penned by respected journalism Professor Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunities: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, and based on a team of highly regarded scholars, including the amazingly talented story teller and legal scholar, James Boyle (his 1996 Shamans, Software and Spleens is one of the most splendid books on knowledge and copyright in the ‘digital age’ that I’ve ever read). The people behind the report are impressive; the range of sources consulted even more so.
The tone is set clearly in the Foreword. On page 1, it asks whether the U.K approach to copyright and intellectual property stifles innovation? Yes, Hargreaves states without hesitating. Google, for instance, is on record stating that it couldn’t set up shop in the country
Are piracy and copyright infringement real problems. Absolutely, he states. “No one doubts that a great deal of copyright piracy is taking place” (p. 6).
However, the report tempers that with two key provisos — the equivalent of a double-knuckled blow against the central props of the ‘copyright industry’.
First, ”sales and profitability levels in most creative business sectors appear to be holding up reasonably well. We conclude that many creative businesses are experiencing turbulence from digital copyright infringement, but that at the level of the whole economy, measurable impacts are not as stark as is sometimes suggested (p. 6). This is pretty much the conclusion I reached in my column for the Globe and Mail this past Tuesday.
Second, “reliable data about scale and trends is surprisingly scarce” (p. 6). Since I’ve dealt with issues surrounding the economic state of the music and other media industries in other posts, including yesterday’s column, I will focus on the ‘quality of the evidence’ issue here.
Hargreave and colleagues are crystal clear that bad evidence is central to the whole issue of copyright law and adequately determining the vitality of the copyright industries as a whole, from music, to books, television, radio and animation — the whole gamut, including patents. A few examples help to illustrate the point:
- “A detailed survey of UK and international data finds that very little of it is supported by transparent research criteria” (p. 6);
- “There is . . . next to no evidence on copyright policy (p. 17);
- “[R]eliable data is surprisingly thin on the ground” (p. 69).
- “[W]e have failed to find a single UK survey that is demonstrably statistically robust” (p. 69).
The estimated scale of music piracy in the U.K. in the many studies they reviewed ranged wildly from 13 to 65 per cent (pp. 70-72). Studies globally are much the same, although a single study by Industry Canada and another by the Government Accountability Office (2010) in the U.S. (equivalent to the Auditor General in Canada) are singled out as exceptions to this rule, i.e. they’re good and follow valid analytical methods.
Based on the extremely poor quality of the evidence, the report states, “we should be wary of expecting tougher enforcement alone to solve the problem of copyright infringement” (p. 6).
Worse, not only have lobbyists been remarkably successful at driving an agenda on the basis of poor evidence, they have made “stronger Government action against online infringement . . . their top priority” without the evidence needed to support such priorities (p. 67).
And the root of the problem? The authors hold no punches there, either. “Lobbynomics”, they call it, a set of unfortunate circumstances whereby:
“Much of the data needed to develop empirical evidence on copyright and designs is privately held. It enters the public domain chiefly in the form of “evidence” supporting the arguments of lobbyists (“lobbynomics”) rather than as independently verified research conclusions” (p. 18).
As Lord Puttnam, a leading light in the UK film industries and now MP, stated in regard to the rush job on the Digital Economy Act, “We have been subjected to an extraordinary degree of lobbying… The lobbying process . . . has done none of us very much help at all” (p. 6).
Worse, other MPs have apparently been star-struck by songstresses, celebrities and cinema stars: “there is no doubt that the persuasive powers of celebrities and important UK creative companies have distorted policy outcomes. (p. 92)
Cont’d on Page 2 . . . . . . . .
The following is my column for the Globe and Mail today, with the addition of a few links here and there. I am fully alert to the fact that this is a very, very touchy subject, not least because musicians and artists are at the centre of the debate, but have been, other than a few megastars, the least to benefit financially from either conditions in the past, or those that prevail today.
Those interested in the topic might find my previous two posts of interests in this regard: the first one looks at the ‘methods’ involved in assessing the state of the music industry. It ends with the crucial proviso that we can collect “all the evidence in the world but still be morally stupid because you’ve thrown the artists and musicians amongst us under the bus”. In other words, this is not just about fun and games, but real people trying to make a real living.
That said, however, I am skeptical of the claims typically made on behalf the ‘music industry’, and equally circumspect that the interests of musicians are interchangeable with those of ‘the suits’ in the business. For those who want to hear something similar from somebody ‘inside the biz’, and who really knows his stuff, look at Bob Lefsetz’s newsletter.
Thanks to Bob, I’m listening to two great bands right now: Fleet Foxes and Mumford & Sons. It’s all about the music, being good, nay great, at what you do, and crucially the fans, those who adore your stuff and rave about you to others.
The second of these two posts sets out the idea that the music industry was in many fundamental ways the offspring of rivalry between the telegraph giant Western Union and then snarly upstart Bell Telephone Company in the late-1870s and 1880s. If rivalry between ‘network technologies’ gave birth to the music industry in the late-19th century, I think it is unlikely that ‘network technologies’ like the Internet and P2P are going to lead to their demise in the 21st century. History, in short, may be a useful and sturdy guide for thinking through the issues now in front of us.
Now, I’ll turn to the slightly revised/extended version of my column from today.
For more than a decade, the music industry in Canada, and globally, has been cast as being in dire straits — a portent of things to come for all media in the ‘digital age’, unless copyright laws are updated soon to combat illegal downloading.
The notoriety of file-sharing networks from Napster in the late-1990s, to Pirate Bay and the meting out of stiff punishment to Limewire is legendary. New sites emerge as swiftly as old ones are prosecuted out of business, fueling perceptions that the music industry is under siege.
Many claim this will only get worse as broadband Internet becomes a taken-for-granted fixture of everyday life. Copyright legislation has been proposed three times since 2005 by Conservative and Liberal governments alike.
Last year’s effort, The Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C-32), died when the election was called. It’ll be back. The Conservative’s election manifesto said it would be.
The Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA), backed by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI), argues that legislation delayed is justice denied. While Parliament dithers, they say, musicians and the music industry are getting slaughtered.
According to the IFPI, “overall music sales fell by around 30 per cent between 2004 and 2009” worldwide. The trend in Canada appears even worse, with “recorded music sales” plunging to a third of what they were in 2004, as the following figure shows.
‘Recorded Music Industry’ Revenues in Canada, 1998 – 2010
Source: Statistics Canada; PriceWaterhouseCooper.
But stop the music. What if this image of a beleaguered music industry is badly flawed?
Cont’d on Page 2 . . . . . . . .
My second column for the online edition of the Globe and Mail, was just published tonight.
The article picks up on recent trends with respect to media and Internet concentration in Canada and which came to head last week as Bell, Shaw, Quebecor, Rogers, Netflix, the Canadian Media Production Association, Open Media and hundreds of others filed documents detailing the stance they will take at crucial CRTC hearings on vertical integration and Usage-Based Billing in June and July.
This entry repeats the story with a few additional links and two additional figures to fill out the picture presented in the Globe and Mail version: the first illustrates the growth of the ‘network media economy’ over the past quarter of a century and the second shows concentration trends across eight segments of the media, telecoms and Internet industries between 1984 and 2008.
At stake in the upcoming hearings is control over a set of industries – what I call the ‘network media industries’ – that have grown immensely from $42.3 billion in revenue to nearly $74 billion between 1996 and 2009 (adjusted for inflation), as the following figure shows:
Figure 1: The Growth of the Network Media Economy in Canada, 1984-2009*
Also at stake is whether the ‘business models’ of the dominant telecom and media giants or the open and decentralized principles of the Internet and digital media will set the course of development in the decades ahead.
Lastly, the issues are also fundamentally about media concentration, a hotly contested subject that is as important as it has ever been, but one that is usually compromised by a lack of evidence. Consequently, fiery debates typically take place in a vacuum and closely track ideology rather than evidence.
To take one example, the existence of 500 ISPs suggests a highly competitive market. CRTC data, however, point in the opposite direction, with the ‘old’ telephone or cable providers serving 95% of subscribers and the ‘big six’ alone accounting for three quarters of the market: Bell, Shaw, Rogers, Telus, Quebecor, Cogeco.
My own data shows that concentration climbed sharply between 1996 and 2004, and has stayed remarkably flat ever since, with over two-thirds of Internet access revenues going to the ‘big six’. While not quite as high as the CRTC’s figures, the upshot is still a few players competing in oligopolistic markets.
The problem with the CRTC’s data is three-fold: it focuses only on the top four or five players. It is presented inconsistently from one year to the next. It relies on information that it refuses to disclose. Last year, I filed several Access to Information requests to obtain this data, but was refused each step of the way.
I did so as the lead Canadian participant on the International Media Concentration Research Project – a project led by Eli Noam, a renowned Professor of Economics and Finance, and media expert, at Columbia University. The project includes more than forty researchers from across the political spectrum who are systematically collecting data for every sector of the telecom, media and Internet industries since 1984.
So, what does the evidence for Canada show?
First, that each sector of the media is concentrated by standard measures. Second, that patterns follow a U-shape, with concentration falling in the 1980s, rising sharply from the mid-1990s until peaking in the early 2000s, and staying relatively flat since then. Third, that concentration is high by global standards and more than twice as high than in the US. The trends are shown in the figure below:
Figure 2: Media, Telecom and Internet Concentration, 1984-2008 (Concentration Ratios)
These trends have been encouraged for several reasons. First, there can be no doubt that the Internet has vastly expanded the range of expression available, but this reality often overshadows the fact that several core aspects of the Internet are prone to concentration (e.g. ISPs, search, social networking sites, etc.) and that the biggest players now control an ever-expanding stable of outlets.
Formal rules on media concentration were adopted for the first time in 2008 by the CRTC and this is a far cry better than none at all. However, by using the same criteria used to regulate banking and granting frequent exceptions, the rules are weak and detached from the values of free speech and democracy.
Second, there is too much deference to claims that the traditional media are ‘in crisis’. Such claims are generally false (see here).
In fact, ‘old media’ such as television have grown impressively and new media markets have been a boon for established players. The vast majority (95%) of Internet access revenue ($6.5 billion), for instance, goes straight to the incumbents’ bottom-line.
Companies that have crashed and burned, notably Canwest, were actually profitable. However, saddled with debt, it could not weather the short-term decline in revenues caused by the global financial crisis and forced into bankruptcy in 2009-2010.
Third, the myth that Canada’s small media market requires big players with deep pockets further underpins consolidation. However, Canada has the eighth largest network media economy in the world, after France and Italy and just ahead of South Korea and Spain.
Independent ISPs, tv channel owners (the Weather Channel), online video providers (Netflix) and others have consistently claimed that the big players use their dominant positions to crush competition. The CRTC, despite its own analysis, however, has failed to deal with media concentration head-on. The Harper Government’s directives to rely on “market forces to the maximum extent feasible” have further disarmed the regulator.
These issues will no doubt come to a head during the vertical integration and Usage-Based Billing hearings. Yet, there is every reason to be skeptical about what can be accomplished given that this is a classic case of “bolting the barn door after the horse has already left the stable”. Industry Minister Tony Clement’s recent declaration that vertical integration is the way of the future further reinforces the perception.
This is not the way of the future, however, but of a discredited past. In the U.S., for instance, the fully integrated multimedia conglomerate has become the exception (e.g. Comcast/NBC-Universal) after the disastrous AOL Time Warner merger, the break-up of Viacom-CBS, and collapse of the ‘old’ AT&T. Indeed, the reign of sprawling media conglomerates is in retreat in almost every other developed capitalist democracy.
With events in Canada running counter to trends elsewhere, it is time to think about breaking-up Bell/CTV, Shaw/Global (Corus), Rogers/City-TV and Quebecor/TVA (Sun TV) into two separate parts: network infrastructure and content services. This is called ‘structural separation’ and under this scenario these entities would become wholesalers of network facilities and retailers of their own content and services.
They would sell access to their networks to other content providers and ISPs on equal terms. This would give them an incentive to increase revenues by intensifying the use of their networks by others instead of by prioritizing services and content they own. Over a century of experience teaches a simple rule: when allowed to combine network ownership with the content delivered over them, incumbents will always confer advantages on themselves that they deny to others.
Steps to address this reality are already in place in the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Sweden. There may be circumstances in Canada that require unique adaptations of the separations principle. However, only by hiving off control over the medium (networks) from control over the message (content) will innovation, competition, free speech and an open network media ecology trump the incumbents’ vested interests and dogma.
The other day I posted that Telus stands apart from the other dominant integrated telecom and media giants in Canada — Bell, Rogers, Shaw, Quebecor and Cogeco — on several grounds.
First, that while it has Usage Based Billing and bandwidth caps on the books, it has yet to implement them — although it has just announced plans to do so. If it does, it will be in the same league as the rest of the incumbents. Until then, there is still a chance that it will back down.
Second, unlike the other ‘big 5′, it is not a fully-integrated media conglomerate. It does not own broadcasting or other major ‘content’ services.
Third, it is opposed to vertical integration because companies that own the ‘medium’ and the ‘message’ lock up content in ways that are anti-competitive and against open networks. It is already encountering the difficulties that that entails in its attempts to gain programs for its IPTV, mobile tv services, etc.
The following quote from Telus press release announcing its position gets to the thrust of its position:
“The unprecedented concentration of market power in the broadcasting sector created by the common ownership of programming services and distribution platforms requires regulatory safeguards to protect consumers . . . . The potential for abuse of market power is real and the risk to consumers is significant. Without proper regulatory safeguards consumers could soon be facing increased costs and reduced choice in their TV viewing options.” Michael Hennessy, senior vice-president Regulatory and Government Affairs at TELUS.
To be sure, unless it renounces plans for UBB, bandwidth caps and to stop throttling P2P services and OVP (online video providers), Telus is certainly nowhere being on the side of the Angels. However, it has gone part way down the right path, and in so doing, broken ranks with the others who simply see the Internet as a threat and merely an adjunct to their ‘business models’ when useful.
A reader, Sean, sent me an email yesterday, two actually and a couple of questions. They reminded me of something, and then inspired me to read and write. Thanks Sean.
The immediate point was that Shaw Media and Telus are about to ramp up bandwidth caps and UBB — the cornerstones of the the pay-per Internet model — in western Canada. To be sure, people in Alberta and BC have already had lots of this model already.
However, while both Shaw and Telus have had ‘bandwidth caps’ and UBB on the books, they have not used them. That looks set to change.
Shaw appears to be first off the mark in wanting to kick these into action, as it told, again, those pesky investment bankers who are now hovering around companies because it is the ‘end of quarter’ reporting season of its plans. As Shaw stated, it has the market power to impose the pay-per pricing model and supposedly the consent of its users. I don’t doubt the former, but the latter claim is circumspect.
Shaw has come full circle in the past sixth months after acquiring Global TV and has begun to sing a new gospel from the top of its lungs in favour of regulating OVP (online video providers) such as Apple TV, Google, Netflix, etc..
Telus, too, has had pretty tough bandwidth caps and UBB on its books. It’s cost per ‘extra’ GB when going over the cap is a punitive $2-5. Telus infamously shut down access over its ISP to the website “Voices of Change”, a site run by the Telecommunication Workers Union, during a strike in 2005.
It has been no angel. However, I am also reminded that amongst the ‘big six’ — Bell, Shaw, Rogers, Quebecor, Telus and Cogeco — Telus is something of an exception, or at least has a few characteristics that distinguish it from the others and put it on, as my friend Marc-Andre put it, “the side of the angels”. We should probably give credit where credit is due.
First, we must remember that in a situation where Canada stands unique, if not completely alone, in the universal coverage of ‘bandwidth caps’ and pay-per GB ‘excess usage charges’, Telus has not yet made the move to implement these measures and might yet be dissuaded. So, for what that’s worth: Telus, please don’t be evil.
Second, on some key ‘structural issues’ that go to the heart of the organization of the network media in Canada, Telus stands alone amongst the ‘big six’ for not following the path of ‘empire’ by becoming vertically-integrated with a dominant broadcaster. This means that its voice has been absent among all of the others who have called in unison for the CRTC to regulate online video providers.
Third, Telus recently told the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage in no uncertain terms that it opposed the Shaw-Global TV and Bell-CTV amalgmations, respectively. In sum, Telus has not embraced the shangri-la of ‘media convergence’.
That, however, does not mean that it is not in the TV business. It serves as distributor of Bell satellite TV in the west. It has its own IPTV service, mobile tv channels, and so forth. It needs programs and ‘content’ for its IPTV service, mobile tv channels, and so forth as well, and therein lies a problem.
Telus already claims to be having a lot of difficulty getting the programming that it wants on reasonable terms. This is more grounds for its opposition to vertical integration still. For that reason, Telus will stake out a unique stance at the upcoming CRTC hearings on vertical integration in being the only major incumbent likely to argue on behalf of some form of structural separation. This is a good thing and, again, Telus is on the side of the angel
Having just been blessed by the CRTC (and Competition Bureau) over the past six months, it is hardly likely that the CRTC will do much more than tinker around the edges with vertical integration. The fact that Industry Minister Tony Clement has already voiced his view that vertical integration is the way of the future and structural separation irresponsible only reinforces the impression.
All of this reminds me that the commitments to open networks is not about paying homage to abstract principles but to a concrete trilogy of real considerations: open networks, open sources and open societies. At the present conjuncture, each is under severe pressure, but yet to be bowed.
While no angel, Telus is on the side of the good with respect to open networks and should be applauded to the extent that it is. In terms of open source, the approach helps generate ideas, examination and conversation like Sean’s email did yesterday. Several others have written lately too, so thanks, but I would also like to suggest that it is best to raise issues here. That way others can weigh in, and go off on their own, too.
These are also the things upon which an open society — the ultimate endpoint of the trilogy to begin with — depends. There are important questions about just how far Canada has fallen from that standard.
We have corporate disclosure rules that pale alongside those in the United States. Not just the major network media conglomerates, but publicly-traded corporations in Canada generally disgorge far less information to the CRTC and Competition Bureau than their counterparts in the US are required to do by the FCC and Department of Justice.
The Harper Government has clamped down on information flows and the general tenor it has set has simultaneously fortified and calcified the historical proclivity towards information secrecy in Canada relative to other capitalist democracies. Without a full-commitment to open societies and open sources and open networks, none of these elements can flourish on their own. It is a thought worth bearing in mind, I think.
The WayBackMachine is a colossal public digital archive of the Internet backed by the massive resources of the Smithsonian and the Library of Congress in Washington. There is nothing even close to it Canada and that is a problem because it means the many of our public records from the online world no longer reside in this country.
And so it is, for instance, that the oldest known digital copy of the CRTC’s website – dating from May 1, 1997 — can only be obtained from the WayBackMachine. Not only is this an important document because it is the earliest record of the agency’s activities online, but also because the ‘snapshot’ of the website taken on that day reveals a bold statement of principles that were supposed to guide all of the CRTC’s activities: “Communication in the Public Interest” – as had been the case for more than twenty years before that.
The last known digital record of this statement is from December 20th, 2008. A visitor to the website on that day would have still seen the words “Communication in the Public Interest” right at the top of the page.
Moreover, the fact that the phrase had risen from the bottom of the page to the top over the years might have suggested that the public interest had become even more important as time passed in light of the momentous changes that have been sweeping the media and Internet. Indeed, no matter what it did, the CRTC’s decisions would shape these developments for decades to come, and so it was wise to have a sturdy set of values close to hand as it navigated the turbulent waters ahead.
Such wishful thinking, however, would have been mistaken. Indeed, while many Canadians were celebrating holidays and ringing in the New Year, sometime between December 20th, 2008 and January 21st, 2009 when the WayBackMachine took its next snapshot of the CRTC’s website, the “public interest” had vanished. Forever.
Ever since, the CRTC has recast itself in a decidedly different mold, as its new ‘mission statement’ asserts:
“An Independent Public Authority in charge of regulating and supervising Canadian broadcasting and telecommunications”.
“Authority”, “supervising”, “regulating” – these are not words that reflect a democratic frame of mind that aims to inspire public participation in the processes that will shape the digital media landscape of the 21st Century. Instead, they are a brusque assertion of authority and part of the linguistic fortress put into place by a ‘muscular state’ under the Harper Government that seems designed more to keep the public at bay rather than to deepen its involvement in such affairs.
It is also a language that conceals major issues and values behind a thicket of techno-bureaucratic mumbo jumbo: User Based Billing, Internet Traffic Management Practices, Bandwidth Caps, etc. These are not words that aim to inspire people, but to make their eyes glaze over and to turn away. It is a language that only lawyers and lobbyists can love.
Remarkably, no record at all of this change from the “public interest” to “public authority” standard of regulation exists in Canada, either from the CRTC’s own website or other Government websites. Library and Archives Canada maintains some records for all Government websites, but its records of the CRTC’s digital online footprint are pitiful, covering two years from 2006 until 2007.
This extremely limited coverage not only applies to the CRTC, but appears to be the standard practice adopted for all Government websites in Canada. It is an incredibly weak standard in comparison to those in the U.S. and Britain, for example, where snapshots of all domains (not just government sites) of the ”national Internet space” are routinely added to the national digital archives and extend much further back in time.
It is a sad indictment of the Harper Government that we, as a country, have to rely on the WayBackMachine to cobble together the bits and pieces that make up public memory as well as the evidence needed to illustrate the change from the public interest to the “public authority” model of regulation that has taken place. Indeed, it is an irony of the highest order that the effort to scrub the CRTC’s historical record of its past commitments to the “public interest” can only be discovered on a website stored and run out of Washington.
If there was ever a way to kill off the notion of “the public”, this is it. We must ask, why has the “public interest” been thrown under the bus on the Harper Government’s watch? And why should we rely on digital archives set up and operated at public expense out of Washington to fill in the gaps left by our own public institutions – the Government and the CRTC – who have failed entirely to maintain a comprehensive, digitized public historical record of our own?
The WayBackMachine and other, publicly-supported, user-driven social media projects like it usefully create, store gather, organize and disseminate a wealth of ideas, memories, records, and knowledge. Some such sites, such as Wikipedia, are stunningly successful, consistently ranking among the top ten websites in the world — except in authoritarian countries such as China and Iran.
As records are scrubbed and left to vanish, we need the WayBackMachine and others of its kind more than ever. Nonetheless, such efforts are no substitute for an official digital record of where we have been in Canada, where we are going, or of the silent switch that has taken place between the principles of the past and the lost souls who govern in this country today.
Democratic societies demand nothing less than regulators – and a government, first and foremost — who are steered by an informed appreciation of who the public is and what they want. We also need a clear digital record of that commitment.
A strange confluence of forces has just made the push to have Netflix and other over-the-top video distributors (OVDs) such as Amazon, Apple and Google regulated by the rules of the Broadcasting Act a whole lot stronger.
Astral, Bell and other incumbents are coming under increased scrutiny from investment bankers worried that OVDs could wreck their bottom line and this seems to have increased their resolve to thwart would be rivals. Moody’s – the investment ratings agency – also recently raised such concerns, while casting doubt on the dominant integrated media companies’ — Bell CTV, Shaw Global (Corus), Rogers City TV and Quebecor Media – decisions to acquire ever bigger stakes in the television business.
When investment bankers worry, CEOs tremble and Netflix as well as the open Internet generally could end up paying the price.
The Canadian Media Production Association‘s recent appeal to the CRTC to regulate Netflix under the Broadcasting Act added to the full court push, as did the Supreme Court‘s decision last month to hear a case from various groups representing media workers who want ISPs as well as Netflix, Apple, Google, and so on to be regulated like broadcasters.
Lastly, a Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage report published last month and the CRTC’s upcoming reviews of its unpopular wholesale UBB decision and vertical integration have also brought the issues to a head.
These issues are not new. In fact, in its famous “new media” decision in 1999, the CRTC categorically asserted its authority to regulate broadcasting services delivered over the Internet, but decided to stand on the sidelines while such services were in their infancy.
The vertically-integrated, dominant telecom, cable and internet service providers love the approach because it has given them a green light to develop new markets while letting them off the hook with respect to issues about vertical integration, anti-competitive behavior, Cancon requirements and funding commitments in the emerging digital media universe.
The CRTC’s decision to stand on the sidelines has no doubt played well to the ‘hands-off-the-Internet’ crowd, as well. The truth is, however, that this has only postponed the day of reckoning.
That day of reckoning has been moving ever closer since broadcasters finally made a concerted effort to launch substantial video portals in 2007/2008 (e.g., CBC.ca, CTV.ca, GlobalTV.com), while offering some programs through Apple iTunes and YouTube. Simultaneously, they have fought tooth and nail to defend their existing markets and expand into new ones, while using a well-stocked arsenal of measures to block rival OVDs such as Netflix. Six such tactics stand out:
First, bandwidth throttling was used by Bell in 2008 to cripple the CBC’s attempt to use BitTorrent to distribute an episode of Canada’s Next Great Prime Minister, while today Rogers’ throttling of P2P applications causes no end of frustration for those who play World of Warcraft online.
Second, ‘bandwidth caps’ and Usage-Based Billing are being used by all of the major ISPs to deter online video use. Netflix has deliberately degraded the quality of its service to help subscribers avoid these punitive and restrictive measures as a result.
Third, the incumbents do not apply the same measures to their own services. Bell’s chief regulatory officer, Mirko Bibic, recently provided a great example of the tortured logic used to justify such treatment when he argued that, despite using the same network facilities, Bell’s OVD service is not a ‘true’ Internet-based service, while Netflix is.
Fourth, the incumbent telecom and cable companies’ refusal to interconnect their systems with others has blocked large OVDs and Internet companies such as Amazon, Apple, eBay, Facebook, Google, and Netflix from bringing their ‘content distribution networks’ as close to users as possible.
Fifth, Canada’s integrated multimedia conglomerates have used a combination of program rights, geo-gating and digital rights management (DRM) technologies and a smattering of deals with Apple and Youtube to shore up their control over access to our ‘national media market’. The Rogers, Bells, Shaws, Quebecors, and so on of this country do not like the prospect of having to compete for each and every new digital market with newcomers one bit; nor do cable providers in the United States.
As a recent New York Time’s article observes, Time Warner and Cablevision are locked in battle with Viacom (MTV, VH1, etc.) and Scripps Howard (HGTV, Food Network, etc.), with the cable companies arguing that the rights they have acquired to deliver channels to audiences’ tv sets also lets them beam those same channels over the Internet to iPads and iPhones. Viacom and Scripps Howard vehemently disagree.
In the incumbents’ “perfect world”, they would simply fold the OVD market into the suite of rights they acquire for traditional television markets without having to compete with Netflix at all. If they had it their way, the Internet would just be bolted on to the side of their lucrative television business.
Netflix strengthens the hands of content creators and rights holders on both sides of the border relative to traditional broadcasters. In Canada, this battle over the essential resources of the media economy — networks, money and copyrights — are concealed by a fog of sanctimonious rhetoric about cultural policy led by vested interests.
Seen from the broadcaster’s point of view, Netflix’s recent acquisition of new drama series and its deal with Paramount Studios for online video distribution are just further evidence that the company is steadily encroaching on their turf — one more reason why it should be quickly brought to heel. Even if we thought for a moment that regulating Neflix and OVDs was a good idea, what should we do as Hollywood experiments with using Facebook as a new ‘window’ for blockbusters such as The Dark Knight, Philosopher’s Stone, Yogi Bear, and Chamber of Secrets, among others?
Do we regulate Facebook as a broadcaster too? I’m all for attending to that company’s privacy issues and other mattters, but Facebook and broadcasting? Obviously, there is no shortage of slippery slopes and pitfalls along the incumbents’ garden path.
The sixth defensive weapon in the incumbent’s bid to hobble new rivals is their coordinated push for government regulation. Perhaps the award for sharpest U-turn on these issues goes to Shaw after it acquired Global TV in the fall of 2010.
After a decade of opposition to the CRTC in general and to the regulation of the Internet specifically, Shaw President Peter Bissonnette laid out the new gospel in front of the Canadian Heritage Committee referred to earlier: “If there’s one message we want to leave with you . . . it is that over-the-top competitors have a free ride. They’re aggregators of broadcasting. They provide broadcasting services in Canada.” They should be regulated like broadcasters.
For anybody still under the illusion that the Internet is unregulable, Shaw and others point to extensive regulatory tools that they’d like to see pressed into service: e.g. ISP levies; extending Section 19 Income Tax Act Exemptions so that adverting on Canadian Internet sites can be written off just as it is for Canadian-owned newspapers, magazines and broadcasters; Canadian Media Fund contributions; Cancon Quotas, etc.
Acceding to the full sweep of this agenda would not just wreck Netflix’s ‘business model’, it would destroy the future of the Internet. To stem the tide, we need to understand just how wildly out of synch the ‘sky-is-falling’ rhetoric is with the fact that the television industry is more lucrative then ever. We also might wonder if Netflix, Apple, Google, Amazon, et. al. might agree to adding some water to their wine in return for a quick stop being put to the discriminatory practices that now hobble their activities in Canada?
Two new research papers released in the past week add insight into the Usage-Based Billing (UBB) debate in Canada, or what I have been calling the evolution of the pay-per Internet model. The papers are by Michael Geist, the University of Ottawa law professor, and by Bill St. Arnaud, the Chief Research Officer for CANARIE for 15 years (until 2010) and a telecoms engineer. Geist’s paper can be found here, while St. Arnaud’s paper is here.
Both papers were commissioned by Netflix, in light of the fact that developments in Canada are sucking it and others such as Google, Apple, and so forth deeper and deeper into digital media policy issues. All are becoming fixtures in CRTC proceedings. Both papers bear one significant subtle influence of this sponsorship (as I will discuss briefly below), but other than that provide extremely valuable help wading through the technological, economic and regulatory issues surrounding the UBB debates.
Geist and St. Arnaud are both convinced that the CRTC’s plan to revisit it’s January 25th UBB decision that ignited the firestorm over the pay-per Internet model in Canada is far from sufficient. As Geist indicates, a whole series of decisions over the past few years will have to be revisited and the regulator and policy-makers are going to have to deal head-on with the fact that underlying these problems is a heavily concentrated market for Internet access in Canada. I feel similarly, and have laid out the ‘long march’ to the pay-per Internet model in an earlier post.
Playing on earlier decisions regarding the incumbent telecom and cable companies use of technical measures to ‘throttle’ different types of Internet uses that they argue put excessive strain on their networks — the so-called Internet Traffic Management Practices — Geist’s first proposal is for a series of what he brands IBUMPs (Internet Billing Usage Management Practices). The basic gist of which is to make the incumbents’ billing practices for Internet services easy to understand and reasonable when it comes to so-called excess usage charges.
His second set of proposals aim to promote greater competition in the Internet access market. This includes allowing more foreign competitors to enter Canada.
It also involves allowing smaller ISPS and Content Distribution Networks (see below) more scope to interconnect with the incumbents’ networks much deeper in the network and closer to subscribers’ homes (especially the cable companies, who have dragged their heels on this matter for more than a decade). Finally, it means cultivating a greater role for alternative Internet access providers, from city-owned networks, to cooperatively run ISPS, as well as expanding the role of provincial and federal broadband development programs.
As an interesting aside, the Liberal Party’s platform announced on April 2nd as part of the current federal election campaign effectively doubled the commitment that the Liberals would put into expanding broadband networks in remote and rural areas compared to the modest $225 million announced by the Conservatives in 2009. The Quebec Government went even further in the 2011-12 budget passed in March, where it announced that it will invest around $900 million in bringing very high speed Internet access to all Quebecois (see here at pages E.93-96; also see St. Arnaud).
It did not specify the exact capacities of the network, but its references to similar plans in Australia, France, Finland and the US suggest that the bar is high, probably around 100 MBps. Neither the Liberal Party’s election platform nor even the much more ambitious Quebec Government’s scheme are equivalent to or the same as Australia’s National Broadband Company initiative, and nor should they be.
However, they do underscore (1) the under-development of broadband Internet in Canada, (2) the lack of competition offered by the current market, and (c) a willingness to rely on a variety of providers, from the traditional incumbents, to municipalities and provincial governments to improve on the situation at hand. They also suggest that Geist’s proposals, far from pie-in-the-sky, are grounded and with some real, even if tentative support in some crucial quarters.
Bill St. Arnaud’s paper also offers much food for thought and complements Geist’s paper very well. He makes three key points.
First, the massive growth of video online is not necessarily causing congestion. Huh? How could this be, with clear evidence that the growth of video traffic has been stupendous, ranging from 50 to 100 percent per year and with continued high rates of growth expected in the next few years ahead?
This is because sources responsible for this massive increase are increasingly turning to Content Distribution Networks that, basically, bypass the public Internet and deliver their content as close to their subscribers as possible. These so-called Content Distribution Networks are not only being deployed by outfits such as Netflix, but other large Internet content and service providers, from Amazon, to Google and Facebook. The basic point is that they take traffic off the network for much of the distance a message has to travel.
Second, to the extent that congestion is a problem, this is an outcome of decisions made by the incumbent telecom and cable companies about how to apportion the capacity of their network. As Geist quips in his paper, the ‘chicken roasting channel’ recently introduced by Rogers, for instance, is just so much bandwidth allocated to that ‘service’ rather than to the Internet.
Third, and this is where I think St. Arnaud has an amazingly powerful and clear point, the incumbent telecom and cable companies — the ‘big six’, as I have called them: Bell, Rogers, Shaw, Telus, Videotron and Cogeco — appear to have no problem with congestion when it comes to launching their own video content services delivered over the internet, e.g. CTV.ca, globaltv.ca, TVA.ca, etc. Congestion is only caused by other providers’ video services.
Lurking in the background of all this is that we’ve seen this all before. A few years ago, P2P/file-sharing and music downloading sites were the culprit; now the target is online video services. The cable companies have been especially remiss in dragging their feet for a dozen years or more on allowing independent ISPs to access their distribution infrastructure. Despite being required to do so before the turn-of-the-century, the cable cos have thrown one obstacle after another in the path of ISPs requiring last mile access through cable facilities to gain access to subscribers.
All said and done, Geist and St. Arnaud’s paper respectively do a great service. They are timely interventions that help us understand the issues at hand and, if successful, they may help to frame the debates that take place at the hearings that the CRTC has scheduled to revisit the UBB decision in June.
However, we should not hold our breadth on that, and in that regard these papers do a real good job at holding the regulator’s feet to the fire (see my earlier post on this point). The CRTC has a very broad remit to regulate in these matters, as the Telecommunications Act (1993) (sec. 27 (5)) makes clear, but has chosen to draw the proverbial camel through the eye of the needle. With the magnitude of the issues at stake, this is unacceptable.
However, I also think that both papers need to go even further in at least four ways. First, both papers make claims about the highly concentrated state of the telecom, cable and Internet access markets in Canada, but offer little to no data to illustrate and support these claims. Good quality data is now available on these points and they should use it.
Second, both papers focus on the UBB issue, or what in regulatory parlance is now called an economic measure for managing congestion on the Internet. However, the CRTC’s Internet Traffic Management Practices decision (2008) sets out a hierarchy of preferences for dealing with such problems when they can be shown to exist: (1) network investment, (2) economic measures such as UBB, and (3) technological measures, aka throttling.
Neither paper says much, if anything, about the top priority: network investment. Why? At between 15-18 percent of revenues, current levels of investment in their networks by the big six is low by historical and global comparative standards (although in line with similarly low levels in the U.S.). And this despite the fact that the Internet represents a massive new source of revenue ($6.5 billion in 2010).
Third, neither paper pushes as hard as they might on how the use of UBB and the allocation of network capabilities by the incumbents to their own services may constitute a form of “unjust discrimination”. The issue is not totally ignored by any means, but I think it could be pushed further and that doing so is important not just to the question of whether or not we’re going to be stuck with a highly concentrated Internet market and the pay-per Internet model in Canada, but concentration across the whole sweep of the network media ecology, from traditional media to the Internet. Let me explain. I’ll conclude by returning to my fourth point.
Insofar that these papers deal with ‘unjust discrimination’ they seem to have in mind section 27 of the Telecommunications Act that specifically outlaws such practices. It is a good victory to be had, if it can be had. And the CRTC has, as I stated above, much discretion in how it goes about making such determinations. To the extent that it has chosen to blinker itself is a problem of the first order.
However, it may be possible to go even further and look to the next clause of the Telecommunications Act, section 28, that specifically makes the issue of discriminating between video services, or broadcasting as such things were known when the act was written nearly 20 years ago, a matter of potential concern. Indeed, the CRTC has enormous authority under this section to deal with the issue of discrimination while meeting other objectives of the Broadcasting Act.
Herein, however, may lay the rub, given that both of the papers being discussed here were funded by Netflix, and the last thing that it and other services like it (read: Google, Apple, etc.) want is to be defined as broadcasting services, which could happen if we were to assign the ‘online video distributor’ label on them like the FCC and Dept of Justice did recently in the US in relation to the Comcast/NBC merger.
I, too, am very leery about slapping the label of broadcaster on such entities because of all that would mean with respect to CanCon rules and the like. The CRTC has always indicated that it believes that it has the authority to regulate online video distributors under the Broadcasting Act (see its seminal 1999 new media decision here), but up to now has not seen Internet television services as being significant enough and too experimental to actually do so.
The question of whether ISPs could also be brought under the purview of broadcasting regulations so that, just like cable and Direct-to-Home satellite providers, they too could be required to contribute to funding and displaying CanCon has also been hotly contested. That route seemed to be foreclosed by a Federal Court of Appeal decision in 2010, but that too has now been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Now, the incumbents en masse are pushing hard to have OVDs like Netflix, Apple and Google regulated as broadcasters just like their own broadcasting-related services. The irony here is that for Netflix to push its case on UBB as hard as possible, adding some water to its wine by accepting some such designation could go a very long way to putting a stop to the discriminatory practices that are now hobbling its access to Canadian subscribers.
While this is far beyond the scope of what I can say here, perhaps a new designation along the OVD line devised in the US might be imported into Canada for just such purposes. That would mean distinct treatment from broadcast television in general, but also some obligations to open up their services to Canadian media creators.
It might also allow a much more forceful push against the anti-discrimination rules of not just one section of the Telecommunications Act, but both sections 27 and 28. Done right, this need not ‘trap’ new players like Netflix in the maw of outmoded aspects of the Broadcasting Act. Instead, it could potentially help to usher in an entirely new media model where all of the bits and pieces that make up the traditional media model are disassembled and reassembled anew in light of the realities of the digital network media industries in the 21st century.
And finally to return to my fourth critique of the Geist and St. Arnaud papers. Both papers target the upcoming UBB decision. This is great, but I think it might be helpful to try and kill two birds with one stone by putting another potentially even more important upcoming regulatory review in their sights: namely, the CRTC’s hearings scheduled for June 2011 on vertical integration.
The ‘vertical integration’ hearings were scheduled late last year but given added impetus when the CRTC approved Bell’s acquisition of CTV last month. The idea of holding such hearings reflects the fact that Canada now also has the dubious honour of standing alone in the extent to which fully-integrated media conglomerates have become the norm. In the U.S., the fully integrated media conglomerate has become the exception (e.g. Comcast/NBC-Universal) after the disastrous AOL Time Warner merger and is pretty much in retreat in almost every other developed capitalist democracy.
There is indeed every reason to be very skeptical about these hearings given that they are a classic case of “bolting the barn door after the horse has already left the stable”. However, given that the use of UBB is completely tangled up with the crucial question of whether or not the “big six” media conglomerates in Canada — Bell, Shaw, Videotron, Rogers, Shaw, Telus (the latter to a lesser extent) — are using the pay-per Internet model to disadvantage competitors and to protect their own traditional television services, as well as their recently-minted internet video services, we must keep our eyes on the full range of big issues before us.
Not being the quickest guy with numbers, I often wonder just how much of what we can do on the Internet before hitting the Rogers ‘Bandwith Cap” wall that comes with my service? Using Rogers high-speed express service, I get 60GB per month, after which I will have to fork out $2 per GB.
I mean, first of all, just having to even think about this, let alone having to calculate it is a pain in the neck. The Globe and Mail had a good break-down the other day of how much bandwidth is involved in downloading email, music files, tv programs and movies. Here’s its graphic.
So, I could send 4 million emails or download 8,570 songs, 37.5 television shows (hd) and 19 movies (hd). Even if I’m a mad, crazy emailer or music downloader, I’d unlikely hit the limit. But, then again, what if I had a mass distribution list for the eco-feminist news letter I send out to 2,000 people every month, or to my red meat eaters club?
What if I play World of Warcraft? If you think I’m being funny, well, I am trying. But take a look at Teresa Murphy’s letter to the CRTC outlining how Rogers throttles World of Warcraft players. The problem is that restrictions and limits on how we use the Internet are popping up all over the place and for everyone, not just the villified ‘bandwidth hogs’.
The limits are also impinging on how Netflix operates in Canada as well. On March 28 2011, Netflix set the default quality of its video streaming service in Canada to low to help people conserve bandwidth.
In other words, Netflix has deliberately degraded it services relative to what it offers in the U.S. in response to the restrictive conditions imposed by the ‘big six ISPs’ in this country: Bell, Telus, Shaw, Rogers, Quebecor and Cogeco. Users do, however, have a choice and can still select from three settings:
- “Good” – The default setting with good picture quality and lowest data use per hour (about 0.3 GBytes/hour)
- “Better” – Better picture quality and medium data use per hour (about 0.7 GBytes/hour)
- “Best” – Best picture quality and highest date use per hour (generally about 1.0 GBytes/hour – or up to 2.3 GBytes/hour when streaming HD content)
Tying up the Internet and its users in a thicket of technical and economic restrictions, however, could come back to bite the big 6 in the ass. For that too happen, however, we probably shouldn’t look to the CRTC or to the Harper Government.
The CRTC has already brazenly said that the review sparked by the furor over its January 25, 2011 UBB decision will be narrowly focused on that decision alone. In doing so, it ruled out a critical public examination of the ‘long march’ to the pay-per, provider controlled Internet model in Canada.
Industry Minister Tony Clement is a little more ambivalent on the matter. He offered no rebuke to the CRTC for stubbornly sticking to its myopic focus. He did, however, rebuke Bell’s attempt to replace its wholesale UBB with a new Aggregate Volume Pricing Model.
There are two more interesting areas that hold better prospects of turning this wreck of a digital media policy around, and both lead straight not to the consumer Internet market but rather to the capital investment market.
In a study by the New York branch of the investment bank, Credit Suisse, the author stated that the added cost of using over-the-top video services such as Netflix, AppleTV, etc. due to ‘excess usage charges’ (but which the “big six” exempt their own video/tv services from) could result in people cutting back on their cable and satellite bills. They could do that either by subscribing to a cheaper tier of channels, or dumping cable and satellite TV altogether.
The latter is improbable, at least in any great number, anytime soon. The idea of cutting back to a cheaper tier of cable channels while cobbling together a range of over-the-top services such as Netflix, Boxee, etc., however, may have more legs. That scares the investment bankers because cheaper tiers mean lower ARPUs (average revenue per user), in the lingo, and that is one of the holy grails for figuring out how much companies are worth on the stock market, i.e. their market capitalization.
The UBB uproar has also spawned fears in the capital investment markets in Canada that Bell, for one, is taking seriously. Thus, during a Conference Call on February 10 2011 with Canada’s leading investment bankers, Jeff Fan of Scotia Capital posed the following question to George Cope, BCE’s CEO:
Yes, good morning. Thanks very much. I want to ask you guys about the broadband situation that’s going on. A lot of investors are obviously quite concerned about what’s going on on the regulatory front with usage-based billing so perhaps can you give us a sense of what . . . the impact of this could be should the government move forward on a more Draconian basis? (emphasis added, see page 12)
Fan was not alone in raising the issue. And Cope went on and on to assuage any concerns. But look again at the last line in Fan’s quote that brands any attempt by regulators to roll back the pay-per Internet model juggernaut would be “Draconian”. Clearly, investment bankers are not on the side of the ‘good and the just’, but their fears reveal cracks in the walls that may play well into the hands of those who do want to turn back the tide.
These are important things to bear in mind as the politics of the Internet unfold. I’ve said in the past that the CRTC is constrained by a heavy-handed and interventionist Harper Government. It is also constrained, apparently, by perceptions on Bay Street. It is also limited by its own timidity.
Nonetheless, there is scope for maneouvre in all this. So long as World of Warcraft players and Internet users of the world unite there may yet be opportunity to stem the tide. A quick search of the Internet shows that others around the world wish Canadians well in their battle against a model that they hope never sees the light of day in their own countries (or more correctly, hope that it never becomes the norm, as it is in Canada, as Professor Geist’s recent study shows).