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Canada in the Minority on Vertical Integration, UBB

My second column for the online edition of the Globe and Mail, was just published tonight. 

The article picks up on recent trends with respect to media and Internet concentration in Canada and which came to head last week as Bell, Shaw, Quebecor, Rogers, Netflix, the Canadian Media Production Association, Open Media and hundreds of others filed documents detailing the stance they will take at crucial CRTC hearings on vertical integration and Usage-Based Billing in June and July.

This entry repeats the story with a few additional links and two additional figures to fill out the picture presented in the Globe and Mail version: the first illustrates the growth of the ‘network media economy’ over the past quarter of a century and the second shows concentration trends across eight segments of the media, telecoms and Internet industries between 1984 and 2008.

At stake in the upcoming hearings is control over a set of industries – what I call the ‘network media industries’ – that have grown immensely from $42.3 billion in revenue to nearly $74 billion between 1996 and 2009 (adjusted for inflation), as the following figure shows:

Figure 1: The Growth of the Network Media Economy in Canada, 1984-2009*

Also at stake is whether the ‘business models’ of the dominant telecom and media giants or the open and decentralized principles of the Internet and digital media will set the course of development in the decades ahead.

Lastly, the issues are also fundamentally about media concentration, a hotly contested subject that is as important as it has ever been, but one that is usually compromised by a lack of evidence. Consequently, fiery debates typically take place in a vacuum and closely track ideology rather than evidence.

To take one example, the existence of 500 ISPs suggests a highly competitive market. CRTC data, however, point in the opposite direction, with the ‘old’ telephone or cable providers serving 95% of subscribers and the ‘big six’ alone accounting for three quarters of the market: Bell, Shaw, Rogers, Telus, Quebecor, Cogeco.

My own data shows that concentration climbed sharply between 1996 and 2004, and has stayed remarkably flat ever since, with over two-thirds of Internet access revenues going to the ‘big six’. While not quite as high as the CRTC’s figures, the upshot is still a few players competing in oligopolistic markets.

The problem with the CRTC’s data is three-fold: it focuses only on the top four or five players. It is presented inconsistently from one year to the next. It relies on information that it refuses to disclose. Last year, I filed several Access to Information requests to obtain this data, but was refused each step of the way.

I did so as the lead Canadian participant on the International Media Concentration Research Project – a project led by Eli Noam, a renowned Professor of Economics and Finance, and media expert, at Columbia University. The project includes more than forty researchers from across the political spectrum who are systematically collecting data for every sector of the telecom, media and Internet industries since 1984.

So, what does the evidence for Canada show?

First, that each sector of the media is concentrated by standard measures. Second, that patterns follow a U-shape, with concentration falling in the 1980s, rising sharply from the mid-1990s until peaking in the early 2000s, and staying relatively flat since then. Third, that concentration is high by global standards and more than twice as high than in the US. The trends are shown in the figure below:

Figure 2: Media, Telecom and Internet Concentration, 1984-2008 (Concentration Ratios)

These trends have been encouraged for several reasons. First, there can be no doubt that the Internet has vastly expanded the range of expression available, but this reality often overshadows the fact that several core aspects of the Internet are prone to concentration (e.g. ISPs, search, social networking sites, etc.) and that the biggest players now control an ever-expanding stable of outlets.

Formal rules on media concentration were adopted for the first time in 2008 by the CRTC and this is a far cry better than none at all. However, by using the same criteria used to regulate banking and granting frequent exceptions, the rules are weak and detached from the values of free speech and democracy.

Second, there is too much deference to claims that the traditional media are ‘in crisis’. Such claims are generally false (see here).

In fact, ‘old media’ such as television have grown impressively and new media markets have been a boon for established players. The vast majority (95%) of Internet access revenue ($6.5 billion), for instance, goes straight to the incumbents’ bottom-line.

Companies that have crashed and burned, notably Canwest, were actually profitable. However, saddled with debt, it could not weather the short-term decline in revenues caused by the global financial crisis and forced into bankruptcy in 2009-2010.

Third, the myth that Canada’s small media market requires big players with deep pockets further underpins consolidation. However, Canada has the eighth largest network media economy in the world, after France and Italy and just ahead of South Korea and Spain.

Independent ISPs, tv channel owners (the Weather Channel), online video providers (Netflix) and others have consistently claimed that the big players use their dominant positions to crush competition. The CRTC, despite its own analysis, however, has failed to deal with media concentration head-on. The Harper Government’s directives to rely on “market forces to the maximum extent feasible” have further disarmed the regulator.

These issues will no doubt come to a head during the vertical integration and Usage-Based Billing hearings. Yet, there is every reason to be skeptical about what can be accomplished given that this is a classic case of “bolting the barn door after the horse has already left the stable”. Industry Minister Tony Clement’s recent declaration that vertical integration is the way of the future further reinforces the perception.

This is not the way of the future, however, but of a discredited past. In the U.S., for instance, the fully integrated multimedia conglomerate has become the exception (e.g. Comcast/NBC-Universal) after the disastrous AOL Time Warner merger, the break-up of Viacom-CBS, and collapse of the ‘old’ AT&T. Indeed, the reign of sprawling media conglomerates is in retreat in almost every other developed capitalist democracy.

With events in Canada running counter to trends elsewhere, it is time to think about breaking-up Bell/CTV, Shaw/Global (Corus), Rogers/City-TV and Quebecor/TVA (Sun TV) into two separate parts: network infrastructure and content services. This is called ‘structural separation’ and under this scenario these entities would become wholesalers of network facilities and retailers of their own content and services.

They would sell access to their networks to other content providers and ISPs on equal terms. This would give them an incentive to increase revenues by intensifying the use of their networks by others instead of by prioritizing services and content they own. Over a century of experience teaches a simple rule: when allowed to combine network ownership with the content delivered over them, incumbents will always confer advantages on themselves that they deny to others.

Steps to address this reality are already in place in the U.K., Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Sweden. There may be circumstances in Canada that require unique adaptations of the separations principle. However, only by hiving off control over the medium (networks) from control over the message (content) will innovation, competition, free speech and an open network media ecology trump the incumbents’ vested interests and dogma.

Angels to Telus: Don’t be Evil

A reader, Sean, sent me an email yesterday, two actually and a couple of questions. They reminded me of something, and then inspired me to read and write. Thanks Sean.

The immediate point was that Shaw Media and Telus are about to ramp up bandwidth caps and UBB — the cornerstones of the the pay-per Internet model — in western Canada. To be sure, people in Alberta and BC have already had lots of this model already.

However, while both Shaw and Telus have had ‘bandwidth caps’ and UBB on the books, they have not used them. That looks set to change.

Shaw appears to be first off the mark in wanting to kick these into action, as it told, again, those pesky investment bankers who are now hovering around companies because it is the ‘end of quarter’ reporting season of its plans. As Shaw stated, it has the market power to impose the pay-per pricing model and supposedly the consent of its users. I don’t doubt the former, but the latter claim is circumspect.

Shaw has come full circle in the past sixth months after acquiring Global TV and has begun to sing a new gospel from the top of its lungs in favour of regulating OVP (online video providers) such as Apple TV, Google, Netflix, etc..

Telus, too, has had pretty tough bandwidth caps and UBB on its books.  It’s cost per ‘extra’ GB when going over the cap is a punitive $2-5. Telus infamously shut down access over its ISP to the website “Voices of Change”, a site run by the Telecommunication Workers Union, during a strike in 2005.

It has been no angel. However, I am also reminded that amongst the ‘big six’ — Bell, Shaw, Rogers, Quebecor, Telus and Cogeco — Telus is something of an exception, or at least has a few characteristics that distinguish it from the others and put it on, as my friend Marc-Andre put it, “the side of the angels”. We should probably give credit where credit is due.

First, we must remember that in a situation where Canada stands unique, if not completely alone, in the universal coverage of ‘bandwidth caps’ and pay-per GB ‘excess usage charges’, Telus has not yet made the move to implement these measures and might yet be dissuaded. So, for what that’s worth: Telus, please don’t be evil.

Second, on some key ‘structural issues’ that go to the heart of the organization of the network media in Canada, Telus stands alone amongst the ‘big six’ for not following the path of ’empire’ by becoming vertically-integrated with a dominant broadcaster.  This means that its voice has been absent among all of the others who have called in unison for the CRTC to regulate online video providers.

Third, Telus recently told the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage  in no uncertain terms that it opposed the Shaw-Global TV and Bell-CTV amalgmations, respectively. In sum, Telus has not embraced the shangri-la of ‘media convergence’.

That, however, does not mean that it is not in the TV business. It serves as distributor of Bell satellite TV in the west. It has its own IPTV service, mobile tv channels, and so forth. It  needs programs and ‘content’ for its IPTV service, mobile tv channels, and so forth as well, and therein lies a problem.

Telus already claims to be having a lot of difficulty getting the programming that it wants on reasonable terms. This is more grounds for its opposition to vertical integration still. For that reason, Telus will stake out a unique stance at the upcoming CRTC hearings on vertical integration in being the only major incumbent likely to argue on behalf of some form of structural separation. This is a good thing and, again, Telus is on the side of the angel

Having just been blessed by the CRTC (and Competition Bureau) over the past six months, it is hardly likely that the CRTC will do much more than tinker around the edges with vertical integration. The fact that Industry Minister Tony Clement has already voiced his view that vertical integration is the way of the future and structural separation irresponsible only reinforces the impression.

All of this reminds me that the commitments to open networks is not about paying homage to abstract principles but to a concrete trilogy of real considerations: open networks, open sources and open societies. At the present conjuncture, each is under severe pressure, but yet to be bowed.

While no angel, Telus is on the side of the good with respect to open networks and should be applauded to the extent that it is. In terms of open source, the approach helps generate ideas, examination and conversation like Sean’s email did yesterday. Several others have written lately too, so thanks, but I would also like to suggest that it is best to raise issues here. That way others can weigh in, and go off on their own, too.

These are also the things upon which an open society — the ultimate endpoint of the trilogy to begin with — depends.  There are important questions about just how far Canada has fallen from that standard.

We have corporate disclosure rules that pale alongside those in the United States. Not just the major network media conglomerates, but publicly-traded corporations in Canada generally disgorge far less information to the CRTC and Competition Bureau than their counterparts in the US are required to do by the FCC and Department of Justice.

The Harper Government has clamped down on information flows and the general tenor it has set has simultaneously fortified and calcified the historical proclivity towards information secrecy in Canada relative to other capitalist democracies. Without a full-commitment to open societies and open sources and open networks, none of these elements can flourish on their own. It is a thought worth bearing in mind, I think.

Two Open Broadband Internet Proposals vs the Pay-per Internet Model

Two new research papers released in the past week add insight into the Usage-Based Billing (UBB) debate in Canada, or what I have been calling the evolution of the pay-per Internet model. The papers are by Michael Geist, the University of Ottawa law professor, and by Bill St. Arnaud, the Chief Research Officer for CANARIE for 15 years (until 2010) and a telecoms engineer. Geist’s paper can be found here, while St. Arnaud’s paper is here.

Both papers were commissioned by Netflix, in light of the fact that developments in Canada are sucking it and others such as Google, Apple, and so forth deeper and deeper into digital media policy issues. All are becoming fixtures in CRTC proceedings. Both papers bear one significant subtle influence of this sponsorship (as I will discuss briefly below), but other than that provide extremely valuable help wading through the technological, economic and regulatory issues surrounding the UBB debates.

Geist and St. Arnaud are both convinced that the CRTC’s plan to revisit it’s January 25th UBB decision that ignited the firestorm over the pay-per Internet model in Canada is far from sufficient. As Geist indicates, a whole series of decisions over the past few years will have to be revisited and the regulator and policy-makers are going to have to deal head-on with the fact that underlying these problems is a heavily concentrated market for Internet access in Canada. I feel similarly, and have laid out the ‘long march’ to the pay-per Internet model in an earlier post.

Playing on earlier decisions regarding the incumbent telecom and cable companies use of technical measures to ‘throttle’ different types of Internet uses that they argue put excessive strain on their networks — the so-called Internet Traffic Management Practices — Geist’s first proposal is for a series of what he brands IBUMPs (Internet Billing Usage Management Practices). The basic gist of which is to make the incumbents’ billing practices for Internet services easy to understand and reasonable when it comes to so-called excess usage charges.

His second set of proposals aim to promote greater competition in the Internet access market. This includes allowing more foreign competitors to enter Canada.

It also involves allowing smaller ISPS and Content Distribution Networks (see below) more scope to interconnect with the incumbents’ networks much deeper in the network and closer to subscribers’ homes (especially the cable companies, who have dragged their heels on this matter for more than a decade). Finally, it means cultivating a greater role for alternative Internet access providers, from city-owned networks, to cooperatively run ISPS, as well as expanding the role of provincial and federal broadband development programs.

As an interesting aside, the Liberal Party’s platform announced on April 2nd as part of the current federal election campaign effectively doubled the commitment that the Liberals would put into expanding broadband networks in remote and rural areas compared to the modest $225 million announced by the Conservatives in 2009. The Quebec Government went even further in the 2011-12 budget passed in March, where it announced that it will invest around $900 million in bringing very high speed Internet access to all Quebecois (see here at pages E.93-96; also see St. Arnaud).

It did not specify the exact capacities of the network, but its references to similar plans in Australia, France, Finland and the US suggest that the bar is high, probably around 100 MBps. Neither the Liberal Party’s election platform nor even the much more ambitious Quebec Government’s scheme are equivalent to or the same as Australia’s National Broadband Company initiative, and nor should they be.

However, they do underscore (1) the under-development of broadband Internet in Canada, (2) the lack of competition offered by the current market, and (c) a willingness to rely on a variety of providers, from the traditional incumbents, to municipalities and provincial governments to improve on the situation at hand. They also suggest that Geist’s proposals, far from pie-in-the-sky, are grounded and with some real, even if tentative support in some crucial quarters.

Bill St. Arnaud’s paper also offers much food for thought and complements Geist’s paper very well. He makes three key points.

First, the massive growth of video online is not necessarily causing congestion. Huh?  How could this be, with clear evidence that the growth of video traffic has been stupendous, ranging from 50 to 100 percent per year and with continued high rates of growth expected in the next few years ahead?

This is because sources responsible for this massive increase are increasingly turning to Content Distribution Networks that, basically, bypass the public Internet and deliver their content as close to their subscribers as possible. These so-called Content Distribution Networks are not only being deployed by outfits such as Netflix, but other large Internet content and service providers, from Amazon, to Google and Facebook. The basic point is that they take traffic off the network for much of the distance a message has to travel.

Second, to the extent that congestion is a problem, this is an outcome of decisions made by the incumbent telecom and cable companies about how to apportion the capacity of their network. As Geist quips in his paper, the ‘chicken roasting channel’ recently introduced by Rogers, for instance, is just so much bandwidth allocated to that ‘service’ rather than to the Internet.

Third, and this is where I think St. Arnaud has an amazingly powerful and clear point, the incumbent telecom and cable companies — the ‘big six’, as I have called them: Bell, Rogers, Shaw, Telus, Videotron and Cogeco — appear to have no problem with congestion when it comes to launching their own video content services delivered over the internet, e.g. CTV.ca, globaltv.ca, TVA.ca, etc. Congestion is only caused by other providers’ video services.

Lurking in the background of all this is that we’ve seen this all before. A few years ago, P2P/file-sharing and music downloading sites were the culprit; now the target is online video services. The cable companies have been especially remiss in dragging their feet for a dozen years or more on allowing independent ISPs to access their distribution infrastructure. Despite being required to do so before the turn-of-the-century, the cable cos have thrown one obstacle after another in the path of ISPs requiring last mile access through cable facilities to gain access to subscribers.

All said and done, Geist and St. Arnaud’s paper respectively do a great service. They are timely interventions that help us understand the issues at hand and, if successful, they may help to frame the debates that take place at the hearings that the CRTC has scheduled to revisit the UBB decision in June.

However, we should not hold our breadth on that, and in that regard these papers do a real good job at holding the regulator’s feet to the fire (see my earlier post on this point). The CRTC has a very broad remit to regulate in these matters, as the Telecommunications Act (1993) (sec. 27 (5)) makes clear, but has chosen to draw the proverbial camel through the eye of the needle. With the magnitude of the issues at stake, this is unacceptable.

However, I also think that both papers need to go even further in at least four ways. First, both papers make claims about the highly concentrated state of the telecom, cable and Internet access markets in Canada, but offer little to no data to illustrate and support these claims. Good quality data is now available on these points and they should use it.

Second, both papers focus on the UBB issue, or what in regulatory parlance is now called an economic measure for managing congestion on the Internet. However, the CRTC’s Internet Traffic Management Practices decision (2008) sets out a hierarchy of preferences for dealing with such problems when they can be shown to exist: (1) network investment, (2) economic measures such as UBB, and (3) technological measures, aka throttling.

Neither paper says much, if anything, about the top priority: network investment. Why? At between 15-18 percent of revenues, current levels of investment in their networks by the big six is low by historical and global comparative standards (although in line with similarly low levels in the U.S.). And this despite the fact that the Internet represents a massive new source of revenue ($6.5 billion in 2010).

Third, neither paper pushes as hard as they might on how the use of UBB and the allocation of network capabilities by the incumbents to their own services may constitute a form of “unjust discrimination”. The issue is not totally ignored by any means, but I think it could be pushed further and that doing so is important not just to the question of whether or not we’re going to be stuck with a highly concentrated Internet market and the pay-per Internet model in Canada, but concentration across the whole sweep of the network media ecology, from traditional media to the Internet.  Let me explain. I’ll conclude by returning to my fourth point.

Insofar that these papers deal with ‘unjust discrimination’ they seem to have in mind section 27 of the Telecommunications Act that specifically outlaws such practices. It is a good victory to be had, if it can be had. And the CRTC has, as I stated above, much discretion in how it goes about making such determinations. To the extent that it has chosen to blinker itself is a problem of the first order.

However, it may be possible to go even further and look to the next clause of the Telecommunications Act, section 28, that specifically makes the issue of discriminating between video services, or broadcasting as such things were known when the act was written nearly 20 years ago, a matter of potential concern. Indeed, the CRTC has enormous authority under this section to deal with the issue of discrimination while meeting other objectives of the Broadcasting Act.

Herein, however, may lay the rub, given that both of the papers being discussed here were funded by Netflix, and the last thing that it and other services like it (read: Google, Apple, etc.) want is to be defined as broadcasting services, which could happen if we were to assign the ‘online video distributor’ label on them like the FCC and Dept of Justice did recently in the US in relation to the Comcast/NBC merger.

I, too, am very leery about slapping the label of broadcaster on such entities because of all that would mean with respect to CanCon rules and the like. The CRTC has always indicated that it believes that it has the authority to regulate online video distributors under the Broadcasting Act (see its seminal 1999 new media decision here), but up to now has not seen Internet television services as being significant enough and too experimental to actually do so.

The question of whether ISPs could also be brought under the purview of broadcasting regulations so that, just like cable and Direct-to-Home satellite providers, they too could be required to contribute to funding and displaying CanCon has also been hotly contested. That route seemed to be foreclosed by a Federal Court of Appeal decision in 2010, but that too has now been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Now, the incumbents en masse are pushing hard to have OVDs like Netflix, Apple and Google regulated as broadcasters just like their own broadcasting-related services. The irony here is that for Netflix to push its case on UBB as hard as possible, adding some water to its wine by accepting some such designation could go a very long way to putting a stop to the discriminatory practices that are now hobbling its access to Canadian subscribers.

While this is far beyond the scope of what I can say here, perhaps a new designation along the OVD line devised in the US might be imported into Canada for just such purposes. That would mean distinct treatment from broadcast television in general, but also some obligations to open up their services to Canadian media creators.

It might also allow a much more forceful push against the anti-discrimination rules of not just one section of the Telecommunications Act, but both sections 27 and 28. Done right, this need not ‘trap’ new players like Netflix in the maw of outmoded aspects of the Broadcasting Act. Instead, it could potentially help to usher in an entirely new media model where all of the bits and pieces that make up the traditional media model are disassembled and reassembled anew in light of the realities of the digital network media industries in the 21st century.

And finally to return to my fourth critique of the Geist and St. Arnaud papers. Both papers target the upcoming UBB decision. This is great, but I think it might be helpful to try and kill two birds with one stone by putting another potentially even more important upcoming regulatory review in their sights: namely, the CRTC’s hearings scheduled for June 2011 on vertical integration.

The ‘vertical integration’ hearings were scheduled late last year but given added impetus when the CRTC approved Bell’s acquisition of CTV last month. The idea of holding such hearings reflects the fact that Canada now also has the dubious honour of standing alone in the extent to which fully-integrated media conglomerates have become the norm. In the U.S., the fully integrated media conglomerate has become the exception (e.g. Comcast/NBC-Universal) after the disastrous AOL Time Warner merger and is pretty much in retreat in almost every other developed capitalist democracy.

There is indeed every reason to be very skeptical about these hearings given that they are a classic case of “bolting the barn door after the horse has already left the stable”. However, given that the use of UBB is completely tangled up with the crucial question of whether or not the “big six” media conglomerates in Canada — Bell, Shaw, Videotron, Rogers, Shaw, Telus (the latter to a lesser extent) — are using the pay-per Internet model to disadvantage competitors and to protect their own traditional television services, as well as their recently-minted internet video services, we must keep our eyes on the full range of big issues before us.

Ottawa Globalive Appeal: Open Network Fans Should Beware the Strong Arm of the State

In several of my previous posts, I talked about the current Government’s penchant for intervening in the CRTC’s affairs and bringing about policies that it had been unable to do by normal routes. I have also argued that such interventions have played a crucial role in transforming the Internet from a user-controlled and open model to a provider-controlled, pay-per medium.  Without any formal changes in policy or law, the Internet has been changed beyond recognition. All the while, the Government sings from the rooftops that it is the champion of competition, innovation and the consumer.  It is doubtful that it is any of these.

In December 2009, the Government stepped into reverse another decision: this time it was the CRTC’s decision to reject Wind Mobile’s bid to become a new player in the Canada’s notoriously uncompetitive and technologically backwards wireless industry that was over-ruled.  Wind Mobile was rejected because most of the cash behind the company came from an Egyptian company, Orascom, and while most of the directors would be Canadian, the CRTC ruled that ownership conferred control in fact. The bid was not in synch with Telecommunications Act’s restrictions.

Foreign ownership has been a perennial issue in Canada, and especially in the last decade or so.  While the discussion has been endless, there has been no decision by the Canadian government to change the law.  The Industry Minister’s decision in 2009 to over-rule the CRTC and green-light Wind Mobile was essentially an attempt to change the law by stealth.  The introduction of Wind Mobile was no doubt a much needed shot in the arm for an anemic industry.  Yet, doing end runs around the law and ramming the Government’s choices down the regulator’s throat is not the proper way to do this; either a change in the existing Telecommunications Act or a new law altogether is the right way to go.

The Order in Council overturning the CRTC in the Wind Mobile was declared illegal on February 4, 2011 by a Federal Court. Industry Minister Tony Clement served notice on February 15th that the Government is appealing the court’s decision. This will certainly keep Wind Mobile on life support for a while, but it will do nothing but delay action on foreign ownership.

The problem in all of this is that we have policy by stealth and hand-to-hand combat. This is the strong state in action, and the state, to paraphrase Napolean, is Harper.  Clement’s announcement of the appeal was also accompanied by a statement meant to counter charges that it has been playing heavy-handedly with the CRTC. That is a point that I’ve been making in the past several posts. Clement wasn’t responding to me, however, but to comments made by former Liberal appointed chairwoman of the CRTC, Francoise Bertrand and another former vice-chairman of the agency, Richard French.  Both have argued in the past few weeks that such constant meddling is deeply politicizing the regulatory process and rendering the telecoms environment opaque and chaotic.

Bertrand has been denounced by Open Media and P2P.Net as an industry hack and well-connected spearhead of Quebec industry, including Quebecor (Sun Media, TVA, Videotron), where she is a board of director.  Undoubtedly, her interests are aligned with her corporate masters, but at least in this instance being against the Cabinet Directives in either the CRTC’s UBB or Wind Mobile doesn’t put you on the wrong side of the issue.

Open Media and P2P.Net’s, among others, push for much greater competition and an open Internet are indeed worthy goals, and I’m fully in support of them.  These groups have been instrumental in fomenting opposition to the recent UBB decision. On the issue of Cabinet Directives, however, Bertrand is right.  Regulation on a short leash is deeply problematic, and while it may get what we wish for with respect to the UBB decision and Wind Mobile, it is not the way to create a real competition, diversity and open media. In fact, it is the exact opposite. We should be leery of relying on the strong arm of the state to bring about ends that we might seek.

That Bertrand was on the mark is reflected in the fact that Clement directly took aim at her charges by trying to repudiate them when announcing that it would appeal the Federal Court decision on Wind Mobile (Globalive).  Indeed, an essential paragraph in the announcement aimed to give the impression that the Government has only meddled modestly in the CRTC’s affairs:

“Since 2006, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission has issued approximately 2,200 telecommunications decisions. During this period, there have been 13 CRTC decisions that have been formally reviewed by the Governor in Council. Of those, the Government has upheld seven decisions, varied three, and referred three back to the CRTC for reconsideration.”

In fact, however, 13 interventions into the CRTC’s telecoms decisions within five years is a lot. From 2001 until 2005, governments of the day intervened 7 times, in the five years before that 8 times, and between 1990 and 1995, just 4 (see Privy Council Office’s Order-in-Council database). Matters are different (in many ways) for broadcasting, but in the matter of telecoms, this is the strong state in action.

So, make no mistake about it, 13 interventions in the past five years is high. The CRTC has been put on a short-leash.  The use of Cabinet Directives has consequences that are sometimes ambiguous, and some that are good for competition (Wind Mobile), but it has also deterred greater competition in services, blocked speed-matching for ISPs, encouraged greater deference to incumbents’ investment plans and business models, and opened the door for UBB.  The crumbs off the table that may accrue from the Government’s likely overturning of the January 25th UBB decision by the CRTC, unless the agency beats them to it, are not even close to making up for such strong intervention into media matters.

Those who think that the Government’s directive-happy instincts can opportunistically be turned to their own advantage, I believe, are going to wake up very soon to find that they are sadly mistaken.

Media Crisis, What Media Crisis

I’ve just returned back from a wonderful two weeks in Portugal.   We spent the first week at the International Association of Media and Communication Researchers, one of the best organizations, in my view, in the field dedicated to the study of all forms of communication and media.  The IAMCR also has a great reach globally, with scholars from all over the world congregating once a year to consider the state of the art of research, whether or not your interests lay in media political economy and history, like mine, public opinion, diasporic communcation, global media and many other areas.

As usual, it was a great time and I enjoyed meeting up with many of my old friends.  I’ll write some more on the conference and some of the substantive themes that I came across while there.  One of the most important things that I took away, though, is that the political economy of communication is alive and well, with almost all of its panels drawing large audiences.

The political economy approach to communication and media studies has sometimes drawn justified criticism for being simply code for a narrow-minded and obtuse marxist view of the world, but that is far too simple to capture the varieties of what is going on in the field now.  Moreover, I would also argue, as did many at the IAMCR conference, that our times are particularly well-suited to those who address the current crisis that continues to wreak havoc on the world’s economy, and people’s lives.  In that vein, studying the dynamics of the media industries and the broader economic, political, technological and cultural forces shaping and remaking the media is also a hallmark of media political economies.

Indeed, we can can learn a lot from this vantage point about the current state of the media and the oft-repeated claim that the ‘traditional media’ are ‘in crisis’, destined to go the way of the dodo bird, as people switch loyalty, time and connections to Youtube, Facebook, Twitter, and so forth, in this age of ‘mass self-expression’.  There is a great deal of  compelling evidence and examples that, at least superficially, illustrate the case that the ‘traditional media industries’ are in decline.

The case has been made all the more appealing in recent years by rise of the Internet and the substantial decline in advertising revenue for network tv and newspapers, the fragmentation of audiences, and the continuing long-term declines in newspaper readership across North America and most of the ‘west’ — although, against this, we must also point out that the massive explosion of newspaper titles and readership in places like India and China offer countervailing lessons, to say nothing of the growth of television worldwide.  I wrote a short piece that was published today in The Mark, a recent addition to the expanding range of quality online news, analysis and commentary publications, that challenges the ‘media in crisis’ theme in relation to the media in Canada.  You can see my piece here:What Media Crisis article in The Mark

A full-scale, scholarly version of that piece can be found in the paper that I delivered at the IAMCR Conference in Portugal in July, 2010.

Financialization and Media in Crisis (IAMCR 2010)

A PowerPt snapshot of the main charts, figures, data, and key arguments I rely on can be found here: Financialization and the ‘Crisis of the Media’ (IAMCR Pres).

I have begun to amass a fairly large data set on the media industries and am willing to share with those similarly inclined.

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