Posts Tagged ‘Piracy’

Global Internet Regulation: Tightening the Screws?

Last week in the run-up to the G8 leaders meeting in France, French President Nicolas Sarkozy convened a conference among prominent media and Internet types. The goal: how to ‘civilize’ the Internet.

As Sarkozy said,

The internet is the new frontier, a territory to conquer. But it cannot be a Wild West. It cannot be a lawless place, where people are allowed to pillage artistic works with no limits.

And you know what, he’s right. The Internet should not be a lawless frontier disconnected from the real world, and it is not. It is already deeply shaped by the same legal, political, economic and social forces that govern our actions daily.

That said, the crux of the approach being advocated by Sarkozy, and perhaps to come out in a communique at the end of the G8 meetings, is that Internet Service Providers, search engines and others are being ‘deputized’ to act on behalf of law enforcement officials and vested interests in the entertainment and ‘copyright industries’ (see the New York Times story as well). That is, they are being turned into adjuncts of both the state and vested interests to deal with matters that are, some more than others, sordid ones indeed: child pornography, money laundering, counterfeit goods and software and, of course (and in some instances) large-scale enabling of copyright infringement.

Of course, I’m the last to stand in support of child porn, money laundering, industrial scale piracy, and so forth. However, I am opposed to the full-court press that is now coming from three directions that aim to turn ISPs and search engines from being ‘gateways’ to the Internet to ‘gatekeepers’.

First, and largely since 2008, ISPs have come under a full-court press by the Recording Industry Association of America and the International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) to adopt a notice and take-down procedure. In this situation, once notified of allegations of copyright infringements, ISPs would block Internet users access to such content and, in some cases, cut off repeat offenders. Search engines would essentially make such content disappear by turning up a blank when suspect sites were queried.

The problem with this is already well-known: the gap between what is allegedly an infringement and what the law in each country actually determines to be so is big indeed. What typically happens is that private contractors using automated ‘notice and take-down’ systems take a shotgun approach, capturing much that is on the side of right in the process.

People caught in the cross-hairs have a steep hill to climb to prove their innocence. That is wrong because it turns presumptions of innocence on their head. Here’s a link to the Electronic Frontier Foundations “Takedown Hall of Shame” to get a sense of how overly-broad notices also curtail freedom of expression.

Second, Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies began to go out of favour in the last few years, but as they were being abandoned, after 2008 the RIAA and its international counterparts were signing new memoranda of understanding with ISPs that enrolled the latter in the effort to combat piracy. The RIAA and IFPI have also pushed hard for national laws to accomplish the same ends. In other words, the RIAA is using technology, States and Markets to accomplish its goal of clamping down on content.

Sarkozy and the French Government were early and enthusiastic endorsers of such efforts and the three strikes law in France is considered by most to be particularly draconian. The IFPI has also chalked up several wins for such measures in other countries as well, including Sweden, South Korea, Taiwan and the UK, among a few others (see pp. 25-27).

Now, however, and at least in Britain such measures are under severe challenge in the courts by way of initiatives launched by two of Britain’s biggest ISPs, BT and TalkTalk, and in the court of public opinion, where they are losing badly. Yet, just as such measures come under severe criticism and challenge in some countries, they are being expanded in others.
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LobbyNomics: Kings, Queens, Copyright and Canada — Lessons to and from the UK

A new, independent report commissioned by the British Prime Minister has just come out. It’s observations are astute and damning: mostly with respect to the claims used to rush the Digital Economy Act of last year into law after only 2 hours of Parliamentary debate and for the exceedingly poor quality of the evidence upon which that questionable law, and the debate over copyright/intellectual property generally, takes place.

The report was penned by respected journalism Professor Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunities: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, and based on a team of highly regarded scholars, including the amazingly talented story teller and legal scholar, James Boyle (his 1996 Shamans, Software and Spleens is one of the most splendid books on knowledge and copyright in the ‘digital age’ that I’ve ever read).  The people behind the report are impressive; the range of sources consulted even more so.

The tone is set clearly in the Foreword. On page 1, it asks whether the U.K approach to copyright and intellectual property stifles innovation?  Yes, Hargreaves states without hesitating. Google, for instance, is on record stating that it couldn’t set up shop in the country

Are piracy and copyright infringement real problems. Absolutely, he states. “No one doubts that a great deal of copyright piracy is taking place” (p. 6).

However, the report tempers that with two key provisos — the equivalent of a double-knuckled blow against the central props of the ‘copyright industry’.

First, “sales and profitability levels in most creative business sectors appear to be holding up reasonably well.  We conclude that many creative businesses are experiencing turbulence from digital copyright infringement, but that at the level of the whole economy, measurable impacts are not as stark as is sometimes suggested (p. 6). This is pretty much the conclusion I reached in my column for the Globe and Mail this past Tuesday.

Second, “reliable data about scale and trends is surprisingly scarce” (p. 6). Since I’ve dealt with issues surrounding the economic state of the music and other media industries in other posts, including yesterday’s column, I will focus on the ‘quality of the evidence’ issue here.

Hargreave and colleagues are crystal clear that bad evidence is central to the whole issue of copyright law and adequately determining the vitality of the copyright industries as a whole, from music, to books, television, radio and animation — the whole gamut, including patents. A few examples help to illustrate the point:

  • “A detailed survey of UK and international data finds that very little of it is supported by transparent research criteria” (p. 6);
  • “There is . . . next to no evidence on copyright policy (p. 17);
  • “[R]eliable data is surprisingly thin on the ground” (p. 69).
  • “[W]e have failed to find a single UK survey that is demonstrably statistically robust” (p. 69).

The estimated scale of music piracy in the U.K. in the many studies they reviewed ranged wildly from 13 to 65 per cent (pp. 70-72). Studies globally are much the same, although a single study by Industry Canada and another by the Government Accountability Office (2010) in the U.S. (equivalent to the Auditor General in Canada) are singled out as exceptions to this rule, i.e. they’re good and follow valid analytical methods.

Based on the extremely poor quality of the evidence, the report states, “we should be wary of expecting tougher enforcement alone to solve the problem of copyright infringement” (p. 6).

Worse, not only have lobbyists been remarkably successful at driving an agenda on the basis of poor evidence, they have made “stronger Government action against online infringement . . .  their top priority” without the evidence needed to support such priorities (p. 67).

And the root of the problem?  The authors hold no punches there, either. “Lobbynomics”, they call it, a set of unfortunate circumstances whereby:

“Much of the data needed to develop empirical evidence on copyright and designs is privately held.  It enters the public domain chiefly in the form of “evidence” supporting the arguments of lobbyists (“lobbynomics”) rather than as independently verified research conclusions” (p. 18).

As Lord Puttnam, a leading light in the UK film industries and now MP, stated in regard to the rush job on the Digital Economy Act, “We have been subjected to an extraordinary degree of lobbying… The lobbying process . . . has done none of us very much help at all” (p. 6).

Worse, other MPs have apparently been star-struck by songstresses, celebrities and cinema stars: “there is no doubt that the persuasive powers of celebrities and important UK creative companies have distorted policy outcomes. (p. 92)
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“The Death of the Music Industry” in Canada and other Copyright Myths

The following is my column for the Globe and Mail today, with the addition of a few links here and there. I am fully alert to the fact that this is a very, very touchy subject, not least because musicians and artists are at the centre of the debate, but have been, other than a few megastars, the least to benefit financially from either conditions in the past, or those that prevail today.

Those interested in the topic might find my previous two posts of interests in this regard: the first one looks at the ‘methods’ involved in assessing the state of the music industry. It ends with the crucial proviso that we can collect “all the evidence in the world but still be morally stupid because you’ve thrown the artists and musicians amongst us under the bus”. In other words, this is not just about fun and games, but real people trying to make a real living.

That said, however, I am skeptical of the claims typically made on behalf the ‘music industry’, and equally circumspect that the interests of musicians are interchangeable with those of ‘the suits’ in the business. For those who want to hear something similar from somebody ‘inside the biz’, and who really knows his stuff, look at Bob Lefsetz’s newsletter.

Thanks to Bob, I’m listening to two great bands right now: Fleet Foxes and Mumford & Sons. It’s all about the music, being good, nay great, at what you do, and crucially the fans, those who adore your stuff and rave about you to others.

The second of these two posts sets out the idea that the music industry was in many fundamental ways the offspring of rivalry between the telegraph giant Western Union and then snarly upstart Bell Telephone Company in the late-1870s and 1880s. If rivalry between ‘network technologies’ gave birth to the music industry in the late-19th century, I think it is unlikely that ‘network technologies’ like the Internet and P2P are going to lead to their demise in the 21st century. History, in short, may be a useful and sturdy guide for thinking through the issues now in front of us.

Now, I’ll turn to the slightly revised/extended version of my column from today.

For more than a decade, the music industry in Canada, and globally, has been cast as being in dire straits — a portent of things to come for all media in the ‘digital age’, unless copyright laws are updated soon to combat illegal downloading.

The notoriety of file-sharing networks from Napster in the late-1990s, to Pirate Bay and the meting out of stiff punishment to Limewire is legendary. New sites emerge as swiftly as old ones are prosecuted out of business, fueling perceptions that the music industry is under siege.

Many claim this will only get worse as broadband Internet becomes a taken-for-granted fixture of everyday life. Copyright legislation has been proposed three times since 2005 by Conservative and Liberal governments alike.

Last year’s effort, The Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C-32), died when the election was called. It’ll be back. The Conservative’s election manifesto said it would be.

The Canadian Recording Industry Association (CRIA), backed by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI), argues that legislation delayed is justice denied. While Parliament dithers, they say, musicians and the music industry are getting slaughtered.

According to the IFPI, “overall music sales fell by around 30 per cent between 2004 and 2009” worldwide. The trend in Canada appears even worse, with “recorded music sales” plunging to a third of what they were in 2004, as the following figure shows.

‘Recorded Music Industry’ Revenues in Canada, 1998 – 2010

Source: Statistics Canada; PriceWaterhouseCooper.

But stop the music. What if this image of a beleaguered music industry is badly flawed?

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Back to the Future: From the “Death” to the “Birth” of the Music Industries

Not only should we be circumspect of claims that the Internet, P2P networks and rampant piracy are leading to the demise of the music industry, we must remember that the music industry itself is the child of the ‘network infrastructure’ industries going back to the late-19th century.

As I noted in my last post, the “death of the music industries” only makes sense if we focus on just the ‘recorded music sales’ segment of the business rather than the “total music industry”: 1) recorded music sales; 2) online digital music sales (Internet, ringtones, etc.); 3) concerts and 4) publishing. I have provided the details for this argument in a previous post; my column for the Globe and Mail this week (May 17) will consider the specific case of Canada.

Here I want to make a different case: namely, that claims about the impending demise of the music industry is especially strange once we consider that network technologies gave rise to the music industry to begin with.  In fact, the music industry was the direct offspring of  ‘network infrastructure’ competition between the Western Union Telegraph Company and the Bell Telephone Company in the U.S. and Canada in the late-1870s and 1880s.

To be sure, there is more to this than just corporate rivalry over new technologies and markets. For instance, innovations in architecture — the use of iron girders, in particular — allowed music concerts halls to be built much bigger and on smaller tracts of land in crowded metropolitan cities such as London and New York in the latter part of the 19th century. More seats in bigger halls meant economies of scale. That meant cheaper tickets and bigger audiences. The expansion of the concert side of the business was, according to the historian Gerben Bakker, a key component in the ‘industrialization of entertainment”, and these processes were replicated throughout the world.

The ‘recorded music’ side of the business was ushered into being as an unintended outcome of “network infrastructure competition” between Western Union and the Bell Telephone Company in the United States. As Richard John notes in Network Nation, as part of this competitive rivalry, Western Union and the Bell Telephone Company threw vast sums of money at the leading technological geniuses of their time – Thomas Edison, Elisha Gray, Alexander Graham Bell and Emile Berliner.

The results produced several cutting-edge innovations that shaped the communication and entertainment industries into the 20th century: (1) quadraplex technology that doubled the speed of telegraphs, (2) the telephone, and (3) the phonograph.

Thus, in addition to their key role in the development of and competition between the telegraph and telephone, all of these figures, Bell, Edison and Berliner, except Gray, also became primary early movers behind the development of the phonograph and ‘recorded music’ industries as a direct result of unintended discoveries stemming from their role in the corporate rivalry between Western Union and the Bell Telephone Company between, roughly, 1876 and 1881.

Edison set up his Speaking Phonograph Company in 1877. Bell and the Bell Telephone Company patented their innovations for the graphophone and commercialized it through the creation of the Volta Graphaphone Co. in 1886, a company that, through mergers and acquisitions, would be transformed into Columbia Records over time.

Berlinger’s work at the Bell Telephone Company until 1883 led directly to his own patents for the gramaphone machine in 1887. He created the Gramaphone Company two years later, and set up international branches in London (the Gramaphone Company), Hanover, Germany (Deutsche Grammophon) and Montreal (Berliner Gram-o-Phone Company) over the next decade.

Not suprisingly, these three companies came to dominate the music industries that Edison, Bell, and Berliner had played such a primary role in creating. Remnants of Berliner’s Gramaphone companies are still with us today, having been progressively absorbed in one way or another into the operations of Universal, EMI and Sony over time.

In short, network infrastructure competition drove the development of the music industries.

There are several other important dimensions in these developments that need to be unpacked and discussed.

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Building Bridges: Music, Methods and Madness

Hmmm, I’ve been beavering away on my next column for the Globe and Mail. Sheesh, it wasn’t suppose to be this way; the ideas are just supposed to flow.

But I digress. And the article is on a touchy and touchy-feely topic, music, the music business and copyright.

Everybody loves a song and deep down fashions themselves a singer of at least something. At least I do. While the love and art of music may be alive and well, maybe even flourishing, by most lights the business side of things is, well, a bit of a trainwreck.

‘Record sales’, they say, are in a death spiral. Indeed, Google the phrase “death of music industry”  and you get 14,600,000 hits. Based on ‘Google Hits’, the “death of music industry” mantra is about one third as popular as Lady Gaga, who clocked in today with 42,700,000 ‘Google Hits’ (GH, here on out).

Some of the big 4 major labels — Warner, EMI, Universal and Sony — have roots going back to the very early days of the 20th century, and to the mid-19th if we count bible publisher-come-music and media conglomerate Bertelsmann. Today they appear to be tearing themselves to pieces.

Bertelsmann ditched its half stake in Sony BMG in 2008, but kept its ‘music publishing rights’ line (a point whose significance will become apparent below). EMI is locked in a nasty turf war between scrubby private equity firm Terra Firma Capital (it appears it is anything but ‘firm soil’) and one of the planet’s big four bankers, the Citigroup (see here).

Music and money seems to be a constant theme here. Citigroup has also put the venerable Warner Music up for auction, after its former parent company, Time Warner, cast off the company in 2005. Universal remains part of Vivendi, the French industrial-media conglomerate that has its own fair share of trouble in many quarters (i.e. a lot of fraud convictions), if not so evidently in the music business.

Big global concert and merchandising promoters like Live Nation and AEG are having their own share of woes as well, it would seem. The concert and live entertainment/merchandising side of the industry has gone boffo, but the two biggest players have blown up their balance sheets through a wave of consolidation. If anyone ever wants to see what happens when the money guys and marketers get a full grip on culture, or music, than have a good luck at the last half dozen Annual Reports from Live Nation, for example. It’s a disaster.

Even Google seems unable to find a steady place amongst the turbulent waters that constitute the music industry.

All of which is to say that the evidence seems overwhelming that the music industry is in crisis. Umm, I’m not so sure, but I’ll leave the particulars to that for early next week in my Globe column.

Here, I want to focus on two other things that I think are helpful.

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Cassandra’s and Copyright: Creative Destruction and Digital Media Industries

A new study released yesterday on peer-to-peer content sharing and copyright in the United Kingdom, Creative Destruction and Copyright Protection, provides a further challenge to those who claim that strong new measures are needed to make sure that swapping digital content online does not damage the bottom line of the media and entertainment industries. The study was co-authored by London School of Economics and Political Science Professors Bart Cammaerts and Bingchun Meng.

It is a part of several steps being taken in the U.K. that challenge last year’s hastily passed Digital Economy Act. The bill became law after only two hours of debate in the House of Commons and is a real gift to the media and  entertainment industries and the various lobby groups that represent them: e.g. the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), its British counterpart, the British Phonographic Industry Association, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), Motion Picture Association (MPA), and so on.

Among other things, the Act turns Internet Service Providers into agents of the media and entertainment industries. Upon notification, ISPs must send a warning notice to suspected copyright infringers and if that does not work they can be directed by the Secretary of State to disconnect the offending user.

As the IFPI noted in its latest Digital Music Report, it has been pushing for such measures around the world in the past couple of years. Indeed, this push supersedes the emphasis earlier in the decade for DRM (digital rights management technologies).  The IFPI has chalked up several ‘wins’ for this approach in the UK, France, Sweden, South Korea, Taiwan, and a few others (see pp. 25-27).

Two of the biggest ISPs — BT and Talk Talk — in the UK have not taken these requirements lying down. They have launched a legal challenge that will be heard this week by the UK High Court of Justice on the ground that the Digital Economy Act’s requirements amount to overkill.

Cammeart and Meng are clear that P2P technologies should be encouraged rather than discouraged. In contrast, the Digital Economy Act stifles innovation and attempts to shore up faltering traditional business models. The message of this report, in other words, is that governments are not in the ‘business model’ protection racket. However, as I have written in earlier posts, that they are in just such a business is also evident in Canada, where Usage Based Billing is clearly linked with attempts to protect the cable and telephone companies forays into the online video business by hamstringing would-be rivals such as Netflix, Apple TV, even Youtube.

In contrast to the current approach, the authors and various people interviewed for the study suggest a significantly different approach. Thus, as one of the report’s authors, Bart Cammaerts states,

“The music industry and artists should innovate and actively reconnect with their sharing fans rather than treat them as criminals. They should acknowledge that there are also other reasons for its relative decline beyond the sharing of copyright protected content, not least the rising costs of live performances and other leisure services to the detriment of leisure goods. Alternative sources of income generation for artists should be considered instead of actively monitoring the online behaviour of UK citizens.”

Early in the report, they also quote from Ed O’Brian from the band Radiohead, who had the following to say:

“We disagree with the industry on what should be done with the persistent file-sharers. The industry has said we will suspend their internet accounts. But you can’t just do that, it isn’t possible and neither feasible. The kind of technical measures that are required to implement this get you into dodgy areas such as civil liberties, tracker software and the second thing is that it costs a lot of money to do this, and even if you do it, you are going to drive a lot of people underground into darknets. Our problem is how do you differentiate between a serial infringer and someone who does it in the spirit of discovery” (Ed O’Brian from Radiohead on BBC, 22/09/2009).
My only real criticism of this report is that the authors take the IPFI’s data on the drastic decline in sale of recorded music at face value, but attempt to offset it by pointing to changing patterns of music consumption, falling disposable household income and the rise of online digital platforms. Their points are well-taken.
Indeed, income levels in western capitalist democracies, including Canada, have largely stagnated for the past 30 years, while wealth has concentrated at the top. To this, we can also had the decline in ‘liesure time’ over the same period, as the historical tendency for the workday to shorten was reversed, resulting in people spending greater and greater amounts of time at work. It doesn’t take a genius to understand that less time and money erodes media consumption.
Such trends run exactly counter to the massive rise in both income and ‘liesure time’ that gave rise to the media and entertainment industries between 1870 and 1945, as Gerben Bakker exhaustively illustrates in his 2009 book Entertainment Industrialized.
These points are indeed important, but I would add another that I think is even more important: namely, that taking into account all sources of income, the music industry has not contracted, but expanded greatly since the late-1990s, precisely alongside the massive popularization of the Internet. In order to understand that, we need to focus not just on the sale of ‘recorded music’ and ‘online revenues’, but also publishing royalties and, crucially, live entertainment. When we do that, as I showed in another post last week, the music industries have expanded greatly.
Here’s the data showing, first, the drastic decline in the sale of recorded music, followed by the full picture:
Figure 1: Worldwide ‘Recorded Music Industry’ Revenues, 1998 – 2010 (US$ Mill.)

Source: Source: PWC (2010; 2009; 2003), Global Entertainment and Media Outlook

Clearly, just on the basis of recorded music sales, the music industry is in dire shape indeed. However, things look decidedly different once we take a look at the full picture, as the following figure does.

Figure 2: Worldwide ‘Total Music Industry’ Revenues, 1998 – 2010 (US$ Mill.)

Sources: PWC (2010; 2009; 2003), Global Entertainment and Media Outlook and IDATE (2009). DigiWorld Yearbook.

The top line shows the picture: a sharp increase in total revenues. Against declining revenues for recorded music, each of the other segments has risen considerably: Internet/mobile; publishing and concerts. Cammaerts and Meng do an excellent job showing the rise of digital revene
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